

FAITH AND FREEDOM



A JOURNAL OF
PROGRESSIVE RELIGION

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FAITH AND FREEDOM

A JOURNAL OF PROGRESSIVE RELIGION

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1947-1957 *Retrospect and Prospect*

THIS issue completes ten years of publication. The time is opportune for a brief review of the objects of this Journal, of its policy, its circulation, and its prospects.

There has been no basic change in the aims laid down at the outset, but there have been developments in its function as a bridge of understanding brought about by the widening geographical distribution of its readers. A further more practical function is envisaged—that of initiating a line of action. What this means will appear anon.

We have not felt it necessary to commend ourselves to our own readers by publishing extracts from the many letters of appreciation which we have received through these past ten years, nor have we sought to celebrate this mile-stone by asking leaders of our movement to write eulogies for publication. The Editor prefers to make this the occasion to thank all those who have spontaneously taken the trouble to sit down and write words of appreciation and gratitude. These unsought testimonies have been most heartening to him and have done much to reconcile him to the onerous responsibility which he, all too rashly, undertook in 1947, and to the exacting labour entailed ever since. He, at least, feels that it has been well worth while.

* * *

During these years *Faith and Freedom* has come to be accepted as the unofficial organ of Liberal Religion round the world, and especially of English-speaking Unitarians on both sides of the Atlantic. Our policy has been governed by those principles to which Manchester College, Oxford, is dedicated: To Truth, To Liberty, To Religion. The Old Students' Association of M.C.O. founded this Journal as the mouthpiece of liberal theology and progressive religion. From its beginning, the Ministerial Fellowship of the Unitarian and Free Christian Ministers in Great Britain, and the Past and Present Students' Society of the Unitarian College, Manchester, gave it ready support. The main responsibility for the development of policy has been left to the Editor, but the continuing control is exercised by the Old Students' Association at its annual meeting in Oxford.

Criticisms of editorial policy have come our way—it was not to be expected otherwise—and we have always tried to give due weight to those suggestions which could possibly be turned to good account.

Some critics have wished that controversial letters could be featured more often. But it is our view that, unless such letters raise major issues, it is not feasible, in a journal which appears but once every four months, to give space to minor points of

criticism which are significant only while the matter is still fresh in the mind of the reader. The Humanist-Theist discussion is, of course, a major issue which merits continuing discussion. As we go to press we have received an expostulatory letter from the Rev. John M. Morris which we shall be pleased to publish in the next issue. It was to be expected that humanists would find the Spring issue (No. 29) heavily weighted on the theistic side. But that was no fault of the Editor, who had received no contributions carrying the discussion further from the humanist point of view.

The criticism which comes our way most often, comes from laity who demur at the academic level of some articles. While we are well aware of the virtue of two and three-syllable English which also avoids specialist jargon, we cannot refuse contributions which offer critical assessment of contemporary scholarship, the terminology and level of which are already set by the Schools. The Editor has often seen fit to simplify technical terms used by contributors and they have always gracefully accepted his efforts to make their ideas understandable by the lay as well as the academic reader. So, we say to the layman: "Please make the effort to grapple with what is offered to you. You should find by far the greater part of each issue well within your scope. If there is an article which is too stiff, please remember that this Journal has to hold its own in academic as well as lay circles, and lay support is essential to its continuance."

This is also the time to dispel any misunderstanding about our private subscription basis and our method of billing. As a journal which circulates privately and not through the Trade we have had to treat our readers as if they were members of a society, so their names, once on the annual subscribers' list, remain on the mailing list after their subscription has expired and their continuing subscription is assumed *unless we receive notice of cancellation*. The cost of extra printing and postage, together with the work entailed, makes it doubly impracticable to send out reminders in advance of the printing and mailing of the first issue of each volume. The vast majority of our readers have never paid in advance for their second and subsequent subscriptions, and we have always had to assume their continuing support and to print in advance of receiving their remittances. The subscription is small by comparison with most quarterlies and quite understandably tends to be overlooked. So we print and mail in faith and, with very few exceptions, readers not only accept their indebtedness but thank us for not deleting their names from the mailing list even after dropping two or more years in arrears. Every repeated reminder, after that accompanying the first issue each year, involves much time in checking of records and individual billing. This journal is published and circulated at a price which does not permit of the employment of any secretarial staff, so the Editor has to manage the distribution and keep the subscription records of nearly eighteen hundred

subscribers. It will therefore be appreciated as an act of grace if subscribers will see that they do not fall into arrears and will pay their dues on receipt of the outstanding account. We are also concerned at the number of subscribers who fail to notify us of their change of address. The Editor hereby draws attention to his own change of address, which affects all contributors, and all subscribers in the sterling area.

We have to announce that the annual subscription rate for the Dollar Area has to be raised from One Dollar to One Dollar and Fifty Cents for Volume 11, which begins with the next October issue. As the sterling area rate was raised from 5/- to 7/6 for the current subscription year, no further change is envisaged there.

Some six years ago the Unitarian Ministers' Association of America accorded recognition to *Faith and Freedom* by encouraging its members to adopt it as their journal in succession to *The Journal of Liberal Religion* which had ceased publication about the end of World War II. For some years now an increasing number of members of the U.M.A. have received *Faith and Freedom* as a bonus award for early payment of their Association dues. The number of bonus awards is to be considerably reduced with the raising of the subscription in the coming year. We shall not know who are the fortunate ones until some time after the October issue is printed. We therefore ask those who have earned free subscriptions in past years but who do not find themselves on the bonus list for the coming year to indicate their desire to continue as individual subscribers by remitting their subscriptions to the Rev. Robert Raible directly they receive No. 31 in the fall. They will all receive issues as published unless they contract out beforehand.

* * *

The growing collaboration of the Unitarian and Universalist Churches of North America reminds us that we have not yet received any wide circulation in Universalist circles. We have to rely on the personal commendation of our readers and we ask them to bear this in mind especially amongst their Universalist friends. On a recent visit to America, the Editor found a greater similarity between the theological outlook of Universalists and English Unitarians, than between English Unitarians and the Unitarian humanists of the Middle West and Pacific Coast. This has bearing on the scope of this journal.

We conceive it to be our function to increase and maintain mutual understanding, respect and sympathy between the varying shades of Christology, Universalism, Theism and Humanism within the Liberal Religious Movement the world over. To this end, incidentally, we have always tried to collaborate with the International Association for Religious Freedom.

On the far right we have the Unitarian and Liberal Religious Groups and Churches of the continent of Europe, with whom might be grouped the Non-Subscribing Presbyterian Church of

Northern Ireland. In the centre we have the great majority of the Unitarians of England, Scotland, Wales, New England and the Universalists. On the left we have the Humanists, mainly in the Middle and Far-West of America. *Faith and Freedom*, whether it takes its motto from Manchester College, Oxford, or seeks to maintain the three principles: Freedom, Reason and Tolerance, must provide an open platform for the exchange of views from all sides.

* * *

We began in 1947 with the somewhat academic purpose of rehabilitating Theology as Queen of the Sciences. We have not relinquished that objective by taking to ourselves a second purpose—that of building and maintaining bridges of understanding between men of diverse outlook and persuasion within liberal religion. At a time when our movement is fighting against great odds we cannot afford to be divided or partisan in our main effort to save humanity from the worst results of its own divided self.

A third purpose now presents itself which calls for immediate and practical action.

In the Spring of 1956 we applied ourselves to the tension within our movement between humanists and theists. We were then, and are still, concerned to transcend this tension not only in theory, but also in practise, by finding that form of worship in which theists and humanists can celebrate their unity in mutual acceptance. However real this problem is in some of our American Churches it is not felt to be a problem in English Unitarianism generally. So, while we shall seek to follow this discussion through to a more satisfactory conclusion, we shall also turn our attention to what we believe to be a vital issue for British Unitarianism, and, maybe, for American Unitarianism also.

* * *

Here in England there is a prevalent feeling amongst some of our most active minds that Unitarians are not meeting the challenge of these years of crisis for humanity in a way worthy of our heritage. We continue to re-affirm our faith in individual freedom of judgment but there is no developing sense of social purpose animating us, such as is evident in resurgent American Unitarianism. We have had many diagnoses of our state of arrested development. We now seek to pin-point a major issue and to initiate a practical programme of action. This is the third purpose which we embrace as a function of this journal. Insofar as it commends itself to our American readers we ask for their support and reactions.

Statements of Unitarian faith, *vis-a-vis* theological orthodoxy, appear from time to time, but we rarely hear of statements of the application of our principles to major current issues, except by individuals in the columns of *The Inquirer*. The movement, as a whole, lacks machinery, official and unofficial, for working out, on discussion and resolution, the fuller implications of our faith by

important living issues. Moreover, apart from resolutions at General Assembly meetings, often hurriedly framed, even more hurriedly amended, and voted upon by delegates who can rarely have discussed or received mandate beforehand, no pronouncement is forthcoming. And what is agreed there can hardly be considered the mind of the Movement, nor does it seem to warrant more than passing notice in a few organs of the press.

We now seek, by the circulation of "A Call to Freedom"** to discover the mind of our Movement on the most crucial issue of our day.

We ask all those in agreement with the Call to Freedom to intimate on a post-card to The Editor of *Faith and Freedom* their support, or, contrariwise, if they disagree with it.

If the support is such as we already have reason to anticipate, it would be feasible to consider working up to a resolution embodying this Call (or something like it) for presentation at the next General Assembly for adoption as a Declaration by the whole Movement.

We believe that the widespread preparatory discussions which would take place throughout the Movement would be salutary both in bringing many to formulate their faith in relation to world issues, and in offering to the world at large a united testimony of the character and vitality of that faith in the world to-day.

A Call to Freedom

THE history of the Unitarian and Free Christian churches is the history of the struggle for freedom of conscience. Our forefathers suffered persecution and ignominy because they believed that only in a climate of freedom could a man truly hear the voice of God and find the strength to answer it.

Today that freedom is seriously threatened, not only by the outer circumstances of the time, but by the unspoken inner fear which has so many people of the world in its grip. That fear springs from the absence of any guiding religious motive in the lives of nations. It has brought in its train totalitarianism—the result of fear *within* societies; and total war—the result of fear *between* societies.

If nobody breaks the circle of fear we may drift into world dictatorship or world suicide. Either of these alternatives must be abhorrent to the person who believes in God. It can be no part of God's purpose that His children should live in slavery or that they should be blotted out like insects.

The magnitude of the twin problems of modern war and dictatorship cannot be allowed to deter men from tackling them. This is not the first time that human beings have been faced with

*Reprints of this "Call to Freedom" with introducing paragraphs available 3d. each, or 2/6 per dozen, from *Faith and Freedom*, 13 Shrewsbury Road, Bolton

enormous social and spiritual evils. Yet when such problems have been faced and overcome in the past it has been only because men and women have been free enough and brave enough to do so.

Every so often that passionate love of freedom has to be born again. It comes out of a deep conviction of the loving purposes of God and a courageous readiness to be used as an instrument of those weapons.

Who will be God's freemen today? Who will help humanity break loose from the fetters of its fear? A special responsibility rests upon those who belong to our free religious community. We are the guardians of the heritage of those who suffered and died that men might know God and serve Him in freedom. A strong-hearted, intelligent stand by our Movement for peace, and the things that belong to peace, could help to lead our nation, and perhaps the world, into a new era of human and divine fellowship.

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

When we talk of the absence of any guiding religious motive in the lives of individuals and when we talk of the loss of the person, we are talking of the same thing. Personality is a religious value.

Equally, when we talk of the absence of any guiding religious motive in the lives of nations and when we talk of the loss of community, we are talking of the same thing. Community is a religious value.

When a doctrine of Love is replaced by a doctrine of Fear, it is inevitable that personality and community will die. No society has ever been completely motivated by Love, none has been completely without it. Yet if the forces of Love are no weaker in our society than in the past, the consequences which flow from that weakness are more disastrous, since the instruments of evil-doing and the apparatus of fear are enormously more effective.

TOTALITARIANISM

This leads to a situation where fear can become translated into power, and where power is in danger of becoming an end in itself. This danger applies to those societies within the democratic tradition as well as to the more obviously totalitarian states. Where personality is a shadow the appearances of democracy cannot guarantee freedom. Freedom may only live where it is exercised; when apathy and lethargy grip the people, freedom dies. Freedom demands responsibility.

Economic greed is no longer the only motive for the exercise of power; we approach a situation where the motive for power is power itself. Behind that love of power, however, we see the diseased spirit, the canker of fear. Of all men in a totalitarian society, the bosses are themselves the least free.

WAR

Yet the fear of freedom is the fear of life itself. Any man or nation who contracts out of responsibility for true manhood, true nationhood, is on the way to contracting out of life. The consequence

of unfreedom is a vast increase in the machinery of death-dealing, the paralysis of fear makes impossible any kind of action except that which leads ultimately to universal suicide. War is no longer folly, but madness. To blame the communists, the Russians, the Egyptians, the colonial peoples, is merely to project the fear. Its origin is within ourselves.

TECHNOLOGY

The very great advances in engineering and science which have taken place in this country not only make possible annihilating war, but are also in themselves the source of increased political power. They are therefore closely related to the problems of war and unfreedom.

Yet these changes are important in a deeper sense. They are the cause of extensive dislocations within the individual and society. Changes in thinking which have followed from new discoveries mean that millions have felt themselves ruptured from traditional systems of belief which gave stability to their personalities and their relationships. These dislocations are in large measure responsible for the condition of anxiety in which many people find themselves today. This anxiety is heightened, not diminished, by an awareness that the new techniques, if properly used, could lead to an enlargement of freedom.

WHAT MUST BE DONE

So long as men exist, it is never too late to believe in the possibility of their salvation from sickness and sin. The gravity of this present moment in the history of our race is no argument against working for a rebirth of Love in the world. God's power is equal to any situation if men will but draw upon it.

COURAGE

What is needed first is courage—the courage to be free. To be free is to take decisions for oneself, relying only on the prompting of God's spirit. It means refusing to accept what politicians and military chiefs and union bosses and church leaders tell us, simply because it is they who tell us. It means finding things out for oneself, it means trusting one's conscience (and training it); it means backing Love against all the powers of the world; it means seeing men as brothers, not enemies.

To do this at all effectively today, it means renouncing war. By no stretch of the imagination could a Third World War be conceived as anything but overwhelmingly destructive not only of men, and the heritage of men, but of the purposes of God, at least for this planet. The issue is crucial; the way back to sanity, the way back to freedom, begins by setting one's face against war.

This is not the old-style pacifism which begins with a sacred regard for individual human life (though that is not necessarily disparaged); it is the pacifism which stands aghast at the unspeakable sin of shattering God's progeny and frustrating His purpose for them here on earth. God needs man for the fulfilment of His purpose

among men. The gift of moral freedom carries with it the staggering responsibility to live up to life's challenge and to do God's will. This is the meaning of religion.

VISION

But this is not all. A new access of moral power may begin with the renunciation of war, but it does not end there. Fear is not destroyed by opposing it, but by replacing it, and it can only be replaced, in the last resort, by Love.

What does it mean to live a life of Love today? It means, as Schweitzer puts it, "to be a man for men." To be brave enough to live in God's freedom and to use that freedom for His ends. His ends are among His children. Where suffering, deprivation or unfreedom exist among them there is the call to overcome these things by Love. Yet it is not enough to be neighbourly. Who is my neighbour? The modern world has put him in China and Peru and South Africa. Upon the man in the next street are imposed burdens of the spirit that are not the result of his sin, but the sin of society. International politics affect his life directly in an incalculable number of ways—preparations for war and their effect on his sense of tenderness and his way of life; the export drive and its effect on his employment; campaigns in the colonies and their effect on his view of other races; mass administration and its effect on his assessment of himself as a person; mass entertainment and advertising and their effect on his powers of discrimination, his own creativity; the unceasing torrent of propaganda, the never-ending succession of crises, and their effect on his evaluation of truth and the quality of his sympathy. All these influences, related to issues far beyond his town or even his country, press upon his spirit and reduce him to less than a freeman of God.

To live a life of Love today is to understand this, and to meet the challenge which flows out of it—so to wrestle with the *total* human situation that we may recreate the environment in which modern man lives. To speak of the redemption of humankind from sin and folly, while men live in such an atmosphere, is to speak in vain. Part of the very process of that redemption is the ennobling of society. We do not here argue, for a world of high living standards, of comfort and luxury or uninterrupted pleasure. Such is not our vision of the Kingdom of God on earth. But we may believe in a society that is qualitatively better than the present one, a society that is richer in spirit if not in bread.

CALL

So the personal and the social gospels are inextricably bound up. The call today is for dedicated persons who will form a prophetic community—a community of freemen—who will dare to speak to the condition of our time. Did we but will it, the Unitarian and Free Christian Movement could be that community.

So we believe.

Contributed

Culture or Chaos?

*Domination and Submission or Partnership**

A. GRAHAM IKIN

THE threat of a third world war, with atomic bombs and all the mechanical robots available to maim and destroy life, is hanging over our heads. The issue is being decided now, not in the high places of political diplomacy, not in Washington, the Kremlin, or London, not in China or Hyderabad; not by the governments or "rulers" of mankind, but in the hearts of men and women in every walk of life and wherever they are.

The ruler, even with the despotic fanaticism of a Hitler, only gains his strength and momentum for his devastating tyranny from the cumulative forces below the level of consciousness in the many who are afraid of facing the "shadow" or evil, unregenerate side of themselves and fail to come to terms with it there, and so throw the responsibility, which is man's privilege as well as his burden, on to someone else. When enough of the "common people" throw in their hand in this way, there is never lacking a "leader" so insecure personally that he can only "ride" on the mass forces unleashed, focussing them through a perverted will to power, until the insane fury of such "organised" unreason breaks down against the massed forces of law and order and co-operation in the rest of the world which are *driven* into co-operation against a common danger by its overwhelming threat to all ordered civilised and cultural life.

We are learning at terrible cost that it is no use having faith that can, literally, cast mountains into the sea with atomic bombs, unless we have charity enough to use power entrusted to us for the common good and not for self-assertion.

The desperate need to-day is a real life of the Spirit that can be expressed in a true culture within which *all* nations and people can find their niche and real significance, which would make war literally "unthinkable" because of the over-riding loyalty to that which is beyond the petty purposes of egoistic man. . . . People are needed who can go deeply enough to reach the healing and regenerating forces that are also hidden within the underworld from which arise insanity, in the individual, or the mass psychoses which can sweep a nation off its feet.

Even a single "personal focus" that can stand its ground genuinely orientated towards these deeper forces of being, becomes a real centre for the rallying of those who are also beginning to take their stand on the reality of the Spirit and seeking to bring the Kingdom of God on earth.

* This article, with some modifications, appeared as an Epilogue to a new edition of *Religion and Psychotherapy* in 1948. It is still relevant to the continuing crisis of 1957. Personal note on the author at foot of page 118.—Ed.

We so rarely realise the wealth of significance in this phrase. The Kingdom is a Kingdom, a community, not a person. It is the Kingdom of God—the author and creator of all its potentialities—and it is a kingdom of God on earth. Incarnate, not discarnate: using the raw materials of the whole physical universe, symbolic and sacramental in the bread and wine of the Eucharist, which itself expresses the fruit of the labour of God and man in co-operation.

We are reaping the whirlwind to-day of the terrible split between man's secular and religious life. This is a split for which an "other worldly religion", a false dualism between body and mind, between spirit and matter, which betrayed the sacramental principle involved in the reality of Christ's full Incarnation, is responsible. The physical and spiritual aspects of life that God has joined together are torn asunder. So man, divided within himself, swings from one extreme of an inadequate materialism to an unreal idealism—and finds no abiding city in either. His loss of sense of direction ends in turning the whole resources of modern knowledge into the perfecting of instruments for the destruction of fellow human beings.

There is insanity in the picture of mankind using every possible scientific device to blow an enemy to bits, and then, if there is anything of him left, having to use every scientific resource to keep his maimed and tortured body alive.

How are we to get beyond destroying not only individual lives, but all that makes life worth living? How are we to raise the profession of healing in all its aspects, therapeutic and preventive, so as to bring all the resources of modern knowledge in the service of life to the forefront? How are we to realise that the human type in the physician of souls or bodies or both, is higher than the warrior who has so far claimed the prestige throughout history? How are we to reorganise social structure so that more people are whole enough and stable enough not to be touchy and aggressively on the defensive? How can we minister to the needs of others less fortunate than ourselves without the patronage that expects deference in return? We need a wholeness and an integrity that respects the integrity of others and seeks to make them whole too.

Social changes are accelerating so much more rapidly than before that adjustments acquired in youth have to be unlearned and fresh ones made, if any relevant leadership, or even real and effective citizenship, in the newer social environments is to be achieved. This is in marked contrast to the changes that took generations to be effected, with time to consolidate what was sound and to sift out gradually what was unsound. This made for a patriarchal framework which threw up leaders who had assimilated sufficient elements in various cultures to guide the process still further. This was a framework within which it was possible to show the way to others without presumption, because it had been followed and lived before by the leaders concerned.

This whole framework is breaking down—nay, has broken down. New attitudes are essential if leaders capable of harmonising the many conflicting trends and tendencies to-day are to be thrown up to meet the needs of a wider range of social skills and inter-relationships than have ever before challenged the human race.

“Crisis” is really a relevant word to-day. We have not unlimited time for progress. A fundamental change is actually occurring. We must rise to the opportunities of the wider world fellowship into which the discoveries of science have precipitated us and conserve what has been of value in the past, or by our failure to adjust ourselves to the demands of this hour, spell out the end of Western civilisation.

Changes much greater than we have realised are going on, the outcome of which can not be foreseen. Yet, in these, every one of us has some part to play, towards achieving closer touch with realities than our rather blind and dissociated separation of the religious and secular aspects of life has hitherto made possible. If we fail, a wide scale of destructive international conflicts will occur in which both our relatively sterile spiritual activities and our technical achievements in separation will be destructive of the societies that could not hold them in balance. The issue is not decided yet: but the time in which the balance of forces will settle down into a new configuration beyond the power of anyone to modify, is probably shorter than we think.

This note is being sounded in many quarters by those who have been able to detach themselves sufficiently from the framework of the past to recognise that the framework is separable from the actual spiritual life that man has lived within it. The spirit which broke down the framework when it could no longer be held within it, need not be destroyed with it. It *can* find a new form of expression, a new life, in whatever new framework emerges from the inter-actions of the many individuals and cultures which must form it.

D. W. Harding in *The Impulse to Dominate* shows how war inevitably arises between communities where the general pattern of life is that of domination and submission. He shows the need to develop a technique for dealing with differences on what he calls an integrative level. In this there is no question of just putting one's views across and over-riding objections. They are put with a view to being thoroughly tested out to the full extent of the capacity of and information available to both parties, and agreement, when it is reached, is valued as a sign that the convictions eventually expressed have been found satisfactory in a real human context.

The attempt to argue about differences with a real willingness for the modification of one's own views in the process, is a much more mature process than either laying down the law autocratically, or accepting authority uncritically. But it is not possible where strong unconscious impulses leave one too insecure internally to dare to change. Hence the difficulty of getting a culture, based on dominance and submission, to risk letting go the idea of a final reference to Force,

and to be prepared to find the most practicable way of dealing with whatever divergencies of opinion arise. *It is our own inner insecurity from which spring the forces that break out in war.*

L. L. Whyte in *The Next Development in Man*,¹ shows a dissociation running through 2,000 years of European and Western history, and the need for what he calls "unitary man" able to live in a unitary age. The unitary man must transcend the dissociation, which is not due to human nature as such, since it does not occur in all races, but is a cultural product of the European tradition too immature to hold the tension creatively.

Demant, in *The Theology of Society* emphasises the false structure of society and the need for Christians to live in it under protest. "The Christian," he says, "must learn to do his moral best even in his place in a disordered activity, and to keep his mind and conscience aware that the order of social activities is false."²

Niebuhr prefaces his *Discerning the Signs of the Times* with "An age confronted with so many possibilities of realising God's will in new dimensions of historic existence, but also confronting so many historic frustrations, is in particular need of the Christian Gospel: and requires both the relative—historical and the final and absolute facets of the Christian hope to maintain its sanity and its sense of the meaning of existence."

Nicodemus, with his emphasis on "Renaissance" or a need to build a bridge between the "hither" and the "nether" world, which is essential for the sanity of the individual and the cultural health of the community, goes deep into the heart of the problem. "Salvation and civilisation," he says, depend upon the rebuilding of the bridge between these two worlds and modes of consciousness: the nature of the 'nether' world, which thus, like an Ark, survives the deluge of destruction, its apprehensions and its relation to the 'hither' world of action, becomes of prime importance.³ This bridge must be built by, and in, persons in effective community.

Rilke, with his "deeply kneeling man" feels, like Nicodemus, that the agonies of soul through which he has gone are in some sense a coming to consciousness of the forces of disruption in the whole social matrix and that it is laid upon him to give voice to them. He was agonizedly aware both of the extreme necessity for such a re-birth of consciousness through "dying into life" and of his own personal obligation to undergo it and extract a universal significance from his particular experience. He also stresses the "tremendous obedience of spirit" necessary for this.⁴

T. S. Eliot in *The Waste Land* strikes a similar note. Graham Howe in *The Present Question*, edited by him, shows that the way through to the new can only come from those who are open to something so different that they cannot "plan in advance," but can each in his own measure find "the present question" in the heart

¹ Reviewed by Howard L. Parsons: this Journal, Vol. 7, Pt. 1.

² p. 174. ³ "Nicodemus" *Renascence*, p. 51. ⁴ *Ibid.*, quoted p. 53.

of his own particular context and situation within the whole. The question whether the present chaos is caused by lack of scientific planning or by failure to recognise the reality of spirit, is, he says, a question to which there can be no answer except as it is born in time out of our own experience. We were looking, he said, for the growing point of new experience which would be emerging from the recent tragedy of the world's hardships and present confusions. Something was growing if we could but find it and *be there as it grew*.

Planning, as Nicodemus too, stressed, can only be effective *after* the pattern has emerged. He points out that it is rare for the kind of mind capable of planning and organising to be also capable of discerning the Divine pattern underlying the real structure. "At planning," he says, "modern man is an expert: at the process of pattern-formation he is still a tyro."

Although it is impossible to expect the same amount of extraverted "planning" from one who needs to spend much time in introverted activities, if the pattern is to be given time to *grow*, it is dangerous to divorce completely the pattern-seeking and the plan-making aspects of the mind. The great need today is that both functions should be correlated adequately, and unless some "perceivers of pattern" can go on to plan, planning is likely to remain unconnected with pattern and sooner or later come to grief for lack of accord with reality. To transcend the introvert and extravert tendencies in a creative altoversion is sorely needed to-day—as, of course, Nicodemus realises in the need to build the bridge between the "nether" and "hither" world.

The term altoversion,⁵ which expresses the building of such a bridge can be defined as being "in reciprocal relation with others," "turned towards others," "the mature activity of an integrated personality in whom introversion and extraversion are so effectively synthesised that *psychic energy can be directed freely either inwards or outwards according to circumstances*." It involves the maturity of either introverts or extraverts through the development of whichever is the less developed or "inferior" function, i.e. inferior in Jung's sense, applying to whichever is opposite to the dominant function or attitude, not inferior in any absolutist sense, since *each* is capable of being matured eventually.

An altovert is one in whom the dominant attitude towards experience is the expression of the balance between introvert and extravert tendencies. An altovert is socialised not egoistic. He neither dominates (nor seeks to dominate) the environment, nor is dominated by it. He is in *willing* reciprocal relation with it, whether the environment is physical or personal (i.e. social and spiritual). An altovert is a personality who has assimilated the "shadow" side of his nature and harmonised conscious and unconscious tendencies, through the activity of what Jung calls the "transcendent function."

⁵ Word coined by present author and first used in "A Study in the Dissociation of Personality," *Brit. Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1924.—Ed.

An altrovert is open to experience, and is not on the defensive either in relation to himself or to others.

Kierkegaard also stresses the need to become what he calls "The Single One." This is not an isolated individual, but the unity of the person who, as Rilke said, had won a universal significance from his own full participation in the chaos and confusions of the age. "The Single One" has become "one" through harmonising the "many," and holds within himself something of the pattern needed to harmonise the world.⁶

Buber writes as follows: "If we begin with the Single One as a whole being, who wishes to recognise with his total being, we find that the force of his desire for truth can at *decisive* points burst the "ideological" bonds of his social being. The man who thinks "existentially," that is, who stakes his life in his thinking, brings into his real relation to the truth not merely his conditional qualities but also the unconditional nature, transcending them, of his quest, of his grasp, of his indomitable will for the truth, which also carries along with it the whole personal power of standing his test. . . . True community and true commonwealth will be realised only to the extent to which the *Single Ones* become *real* out of whose responsible life the body politic is renewed."⁷

Before reading Buber I wrote⁸ "We have to take into account that human beings, with their own distinctive nature, transcend in their integrity any mere summation of their parts and inter-relations. . . . We ourselves transcend in our essential being all that we can perceive, analyse or express as immanent within our bodies and the world of nature with which we act and inter-act through them. There is an element in the mystery of our own being in its point of contact with the Divine, that is to say, its relation to the Cosmical ground of all existence, which will always evade analysis, though we may always be aware of it as colouring all our empirical nature. In so far as this empirical nature is in harmony with this unseen yet fundamental aspect of our being, we get a unified personality, through which God can effect some particular fragment of his work in the world. We see this supremely in Christ where transcendence and immanence were united in perfect personality."

This is the ground of Kierkegaard's "underived" elements with its real participation not only *within* the Single One, but in the object of his recognition. The world really *has* another dimension as perceived through the eyes of a Single One, yet it is a dimension of the same world. There are not two worlds but one where the hither and the nether really meet in true incarnation. Differences are distinguishable but no longer separable.

⁶ Perhaps Christ is the only one to achieve this singleness of Being, with the human and divine, multiplicity and inwardness, in its fullness, and so is *The Pattern for the race*.

⁷ *Between Man and Man*, pp. 81-82.

⁸ *Education for Christian Marriage*: Chap. on "Moral Disease, Sin and Responsibility," p. 166.

Nicodemus said "We live by the ethic of the 'strong man armed,' we preach the ethic of the 'suffering servant'."⁹ It is this dissociation that paralyses all genuine effort when it comes up against the frustrating realities of an inadequate and distorted framework.¹⁰

The "strong man armed" cannot go far enough ever to succeed on his own level through ignoring the inner needs of a humanity that must revolt against being held down indefinitely by brute force. The "suffering servant" cannot redeem the mass because he is out of relation with legitimate human needs which must be fulfilled and not destroyed.

Professor C. G. Jung wrote "For in reality the fight between light and darkness has broken out everywhere: the rent goes through the whole world and the very fire that burst into flames in Germany is smouldering and glowing everywhere. The fire that broke out in Germany is the outcome of certain psychic conditions which are universal. The real danger signal, however, is not the flame which leapt up from German soil, but the release of atomic energy which has handed man the means of destroying himself completely. The present situation is as though a little boy of six had been given a pound of dynamite among his birthday presents. We are not yet a hundred per cent sure that there will be no disaster. Will man be able to give up playing with the possibility of another war? . . . How can we save the child from the dynamite that nobody can take from him? The good spirit of humanity is challenged as never before and must come forward. For this fact can no longer be hushed up or painted *couleur de rose*. The realisation of such imminent danger might well act as an incentive to a great revival and lead to a higher and more mature consciousness and sense of responsibility. Dare we hope that it will? It is time, high time, that civilised man turned his mind to the fundamental things. It is now a question of existence or non-existence, and surely this should be submitted to a searching investigation and an exhaustive discussion. For the danger which now threatens is of such dimensions as to make the present European catastrophe a mere prologue."¹¹

In all this there is a note of urgency, of something new striving to come to birth in many through their various disciplines and different types of life. The Spirit is moving on the face of the Waters and though many may be swamped in the deluge, and many fail to "endure to the end," many more can be helped to stand their ground and hold together some fragments of a new synthesis, a new context, through the help of spiritual directors, doctors, psycho-therapists, social leaders, and writers who have first to cast the beam out of their own eyes so as to be able to see the mote in those

⁹ *Renaissance*, p. 81.

¹⁰ T. S. Eliot, in *The Idea of a Christian Society*, p. 288, points out that a non-Christian in a better balanced order would be more effective than a Christian working with the distorted order, which so often nullifies all his efforts.

¹¹ *Essays on Contemporary Events* (1947), p. 90.

who come to them for help in living a fuller life.

The casualties in such an age of transition must be many: but everyone salved, made whole, is a fresh focusing point through which the Spirit can effect some fragment of the re-ordering and re-creating of cultural life which may carry humanity forward to the next stage of its pilgrimage.

Whether this can be done or whether the forces of destruction will prevail, depends on how many real *persons* emerge throughout the world in *each* race and nation who can attract to them the sound elements in the masses and give a lead that makes their followers more, and not less, responsible. Otherwise the masses will respond to leaders who play upon the lower, distorted elements in human nature in an escape from the more arduous task of re-consecrating and transforming the evil in themselves, part of which they have inherited, individually and socially, and part of which they contribute to by the renegade tendency which is in us all.

Religion and psychotherapy, mutually enriching and purifying each other, can do much to help the spirit of man to become mature enough to control the mechanical demons he has conjured up into the terrifying destructive force of atomic and hydrogen bombs. Man must master the destructive forces in himself in the only crucible in which they *can* be transmuted, the real human being, with his amazing mixture of weakness and strength, blindness and insight, ignorance and knowledge.

Buber points out that "What the right is can be experienced by none of the groups of to-day except through men who belong to them *staking their own souls to experience it*, and then revealing it, however bitter it may be, to their companions—charitably if it may be, cruelly if it must be." . . . "And if one still asks if one may be certain of finding what is right on this steep path, once again the answer is *No*: there is no certainty. There is only a chance; but there is no other. The risk does not ensure the truth for us; but it, and it alone, leads us to where the breath of truth is to be felt."¹²

We cannot be sure that the moral and spiritual resources of mankind will rise to the challenge *in time*. But we can hope that there may be enough of those who have come to grips with the forces *within*, scattered about behind the scenes in the world, to delay at least the explosion until there may be a remnant capable of carrying on something vital through, and in spite of, the catastrophe of a third global war in a century, if it does come. More than that I think, is beyond legitimate hope; though not beyond actual possibility. Creative forces are stronger in the long run; but at critical points, destructive ones cannot always be held in leash until they have found themselves defeated by the moral and spiritual forces they had despised, but could not destroy.

We have to choose between the love of power or the power of love. The fate of mankind depends on the choice.

¹² Buber, *op cit.*, p. 70.

Is God Necessary?

The God of Classical Theology?—No!

The God of Religion?—Yes!

HERBERT VETTER

IS God necessary? As this question has customarily been stated throughout long centuries of philosophical and theological debate, I am compelled to answer in the negative: God is not necessary!

There are several reasons why the answer is negative and they stem from the fact that the classical idea of God is both an intellectual error and an illusion. God, in this conception, is understood to be outside of space, outside of time, outside of the events which constitute our daily and enduring life. If there were such a God, he would be utterly unknown and unknowable, for the only intelligible assumption for modern man, who lives in a world of time-space events, is that any supposed reality outside of actual and possible events in space-time is sheer nothingness. And even if we assume that there is such a reality, it can be of no significance to us earth-dwellers, us time and space-bound creatures, for the simple, common sense reason that we are so constituted as to have no means of apprehending such an other-worldly, utterly static deity. Such a God is, at best, "an oblong blur"—hardly the appropriate object of man's complete devotion.

The classical idea of God—as a static being who is absolutely perfect in every respect; who is so perfect that He can transcend our world of actual and possible events, things and persons—is founded upon illusion. This is a complex illusion consisting of several elements: a radical disparagement of the world, as being so evil that it cannot in any form be considered a part of the object of our supreme devotion; a radical escape into the fantasy that there is an utterly transcendent divine Reality which, freak-like, breaks into our existing world and miraculously redeems us from destruction and chaos; a radical separation of the polarities of existence which—instead of holding the eternally contrasting poles within our lives and world in creative, complementary togetherness—dogmatically accepts that strand of Greek thought which asserts that the static is superior to the dynamic, order to change, cause to effect, the eternal to the temporal, the passive to the active, the one to the many. This unwarranted dogma, which has been an uneasy and disruptive cornerstone in the structure of both Eastern and Western civilization throughout the centuries, may fairly be adjudged the supreme intellectual error of our common life, the central fallacy that has plagued, and that continues to plague, the growth of culture, society and personality.

It is precisely this dogma which directs the orthodox toward

their dilemma. According to their theology God dwells in otherness, outside the world of common life ; yet they know first-hand in their religious living that a vital, working, healing God must be found within the world. Thus the orthodox take refuge in the idolatrous deification of a man like the historic Jesus. The illusion and intellectual error may now be seen for what they are in truth: the helpless allies of desperate idolatry, the foes of freedom, the enemies of faith in man, in life, and in God H'mself. The orthodox swing from pole to pole in underlying conflict: from the negative pole of despair regarding the actual world and its future possibilities to the demonic pole of idolatrous authoritarianism. These are the fateful consequences of their dilemma. This is not to say that orthodoxies of whatever sort, "religious" or "secular," are without their virtues; but it is to say that they stand, in essence, on the side of disruption and despair, hierarchical repression of the growth of man and God, imbalance, intolerance, slavery.

For all who adore the holy ground of freedom, for all who have strength to resist the ever present threat of authoritarian domination and submission, for all who would enter freely, fully, into the search to understand the meaning and the value of reality as it is and as it can be, the classical idea of God is a snare and a delusion. Its hopeless oscillation between life's eternally necessary poles provides no adequate basis for the integration of our personal religious living, our changing social structures, our culture, our civilization, our world, our God. Such integration stems from a divine dynamic within our lives and beyond, as a pattern of potentialities not yet realized.

Is God necessary? Not if we mean the classical conception of God! David Hume, in his *Dialogues on Natural Religion*, destroyed once for all this stubbornly persistent and destructive notion. Who can refute his argument: that if there were a God who had both absolute power and absolute goodness—and this is just what the classical theists assert—then He would have to be the source of the evil which we find within our lives and in our world?

If God has absolute power and absolute goodness, we have no responsibility, cannot be held accountable for any evil that we do, and have no power either to sin or to create the structures of enduring goodness. If God has absolute power and absolute goodness, then our lives—even at their very best—can contribute nothing whatsoever to God, for, already, He has everything needful. Our choices can mean nothing to Him who remotely dwells apart from us, containing every whit of unshared power and every trace of goodness. Our suffering can never stir Him who has no passion, no pain, no tragic aspect—only bliss. This is the logic of classical theism, the logic of benevolent despotism. Its God is a tyrant; its kingdom a supremely rigid paternalistic theocracy. Is this God necessary? Not for free, rational men! Yet how pervasive is this root ideological fallacy!

How prevalent, even today, is the tragedy of this error, and the

religious depth of the tragedy discloses the essence of the sickness of soul of modern man. This hollow notion divides the soul in many different ways. It brings continuing clash between the sciences, philosophy, theology, providing no principle of integration that is consistent with our advancing knowledge of the concrete world in which we live and move and have our being. It creates conflicts of feeling, promoting not only intellectual and emotional discord with the world of fact but also deep attachment for the oblong blur and idols. It seeks, consciously and unconsciously, to destroy our freedom, our choice between alternatives, our strength of will, because—with self-righteous piety—it assumes that the standards by which we discern, select and act are immutably decreed by this absolutely perfect Being and allow no variation as life and time advance upon their way. Here is the fallacious logic laid bare: God cannot change in any sense: He, the altogether changeless, has disclosed (through some deified mediator and some sacrosanct priestly caste) the eternal patterns of perfection which are to determine our choices in particular situations; therefore, all man must do is to submit, and then he will be rewarded, personally, in a beatific world beyond the grave.

These enduring conflicts in the soul of modern man must be healed if we would move toward health and growth. For long periods Western man—ancient, medieval and modern—has been able to function, sometimes with astonishing success, within this essentially clashing framework—much the same as he has been able to endure and to create amidst dreaded outward wars and revolutions. Yet conflict has its breaking point; and oftentimes man seems to sense, at this mid-point in the twentieth century A.D., that strife—both outward in universal war and inward in universal turmoil—is tending toward the goal of either world-wide dictatorship or sheer annihilation, unless the wounds are healed, the conflicts moderated, the grace of God restored to man in living, sympathetic wholeness.

We must face this fact: neither the orthodox religionists, who must confront the fateful consequences of the classical idea of God which they would promulgate, nor the orthodox secularists (including the orthodox Marxist) who would reject all gods and place their fundamental trust in some new or established social order, can truly meet the demands upon us for redemption. Their souls, now torn, must find a healing touch before they have the truth and power to lead us to a destination other than the City of Destruction. Therefore in terms of the classical idea of God, the answer must be negative: He is not necessary.

But let us ask the question again, this time rephrasing it. Instead of asking, "Is God necessary?" why not ask, "What kind of God is necessary—for adequate human living, for our common task of reconstruction, for the integration of life's poles in persons, peoples, cultures, worlds?" It is a fact of life that man reveres, or else he withers. Dostoyevsky portrayed this tragi-comedy in his classic

study of *The Brothers Karamazov*. Man must adore, or else he is no man . . . at least not for long. We have a choice: to live or not to live for whatsoever God is True and Beautiful. Just and Whole. In fact, each man must choose, and each must meet the consequence of his decision. We live upon a boundary of choice and consequence. No man escapes—not really! God's balance-wheel is true, precise, and powerful: it is the wheel of Justice and of Law. But what is, who is, this God whom we adore—else we perish? He is that Reality which is truly of ultimate and of sovereign worth. He is the in-escapable God who stands in solemn, sympathetic majesty above the petty gods we fashion with our hands, our hearts, our minds, our souls. He is the God above the gods, mightier than the mightiest—and yet with limitations on His power, providing us with freedom. This is the God who, with firmness, seeks the integrated growth of life. This is the Reality each man meets in all his experience. As William Blake said two centuries ago:

To Mercy, Pity, Peace and Love
 All pray in their distress,
 And to those virtues of delight
 Return their thankfulness

For Mercy, Pity, Peace and Love
 Is God our Father dear;
 And Mercy, Pity, Peace and Love
 Is man, his child and care.

Beneath these symbols of divinity lies the reality: dim but unmistakable, distant throughout all time and space but present in each act of every creature. Unclear though our vision be, we still can apprehend his visage. God has a double face. He wears the tortured mask of tragedy as well as the laughing mask of sheer delight. God, with his double face, stands under and above our shells, our walls that hide us from our deeper selves. Living and feeling with our suffering, the weakness and divisiveness within the total man and total culture. He has a craving for togetherness, for growing synthesis of life with life. God, so understood, is the sovereign reality within and behind and yet beyond all our experience. Robert Frost seems to have met him while "mending wall," and has offered a fresh reflection upon the discovery in a poem of that name:

Something there is that doesn't love a wall,
 That sends the frozen-ground-swell under it.
 And spills the upper boulders in the sun;
 And makes gaps even two can pass abreast. . . .

I am convinced that the "Something . . . that doesn't love a wall" is God, God the Perennial Destroyer of our patterns of exclusive pretentiousness, our insulating, isolating apathy, our rigid impositions: our demand for conformity to *our* values, *our* preferences, *our* ways of doing things. That "Something" is God the

Wall Destroyer, the Breaker of restrictive man-made boundaries; the Puncturer of our damning, desperate, proud idolatries of race and nation, sect and self. The true God, even the God of Love, is the Leveller of pretensions, the Overturner of our lust for sacred idols of infallibility. This working is of one piece with His creative passion: His fascination for the growing process, His ever-present push toward health and wholeness, His sacred lure toward distant goals—as yet unrealized.

God is that reality which is of ultimate, integral, sovereign worth; and whether it be his creative, sustaining, redeeming or levelling work within our lives and times, He is operative. This reality is the God of the scientist, who frames, corrects, rejects hypotheses about the ways of men and things, seeking always for exact equation between what is in fact and the theory about the fact. This is the God of the sculptor, the architect, the poet, the composer, the dancer; the artists who are given inspiration to fashion forms of beauty for delight, for expression of their new found meanings, and for relating self and others to that which matters most. This is the God of the housewife, who expresses in her fond maternal care the genuine concern of God for all the creatures, who, with her husband, joins the sacred common quest for joy, for liberation, for life in more abundance; who establishes and maintains ordered ways of living. This is the God of the business man, known as wrath in the pursuit of money first and foremost; yet also known by him as love when he freely serves a common good, inclusive of his interest, yet stretching far beyond it. This is the God of the engineer, who builds out of concrete, stone, iron, wood, configurations of security and comfort according to our need and nature's laws. This is the God of the teacher, for reality is the teacher of us all; and the one who best teaches youth, teaches both facts and meanings of the facts—stimulating thought, imagination and prompt decision for the better ways, whatever they may be. This is the God of the priest, the rabbi, the minister, when they are faithful to the solemn trust in their possession of making clear to us the working power of God in all we do and feel and think. This is the God of the philosopher and theologian if they truly, freshly seek to comprehend the broader and the broadest factors in our existence, making intelligible these wider generalities through the discipline of reason. Then they disclose the nature of reality, the world, the truly worthwhile and worshipful. They help us grasp these elemental meanings in the drama of our daily lives.

This is the God that men have loved throughout the ages. This is the God of free faith. Here is the valid object of man's reverent search for truth and beauty, justice and integrity. It is He whom we love when we will to live and will to grow. It is He whom we dread when we will to die and will to thwart the growth of value in the world. He is the God of all religious experience; that is to say, of all our experience that stretches toward fulfilment,

toward deeper harmony of life with life. For the most part it has not been the conceptual God of the philosophers and theologians, but it is becoming ever more so today. Whitehead and Hartshorne are among the best of a growing movement that opens vistas of the new theism which draws directly upon and squares well with immediate experience, with the methods and findings of the contemporary natural and social sciences, with the insights into reality by our more discerning artists, with the wisdom of reformers, statesmen, prophets, seers . . . and with the calm demands of common sense. The logic of the new theism is a logic growing out of life and returning back unto the same. It is not the logic of divine despotism but the logic of love. The new theism provides a firm, dynamic center for both stability and change in our ever constant quest for merging life with life at greater height and depth and breadth and in greater strength.

What we have been asserting is that there are two types of belief in God, one explicit, the other implicit. Our quarrel here is with the explicit classical idea of God but not with the authentic implicit faith and devotion of man in all periods of human existence when he has perceived that which is truly of sovereign worth. Religious experience is one thing, theology another; just as life and thought are, to some extent, capable of separation. Even so, life cannot be lived with joy and adequacy unless its rudder finds its guide in correct ideas; and thought is meaningless unless it ascends from life and descends unto its source.

Part of the genius of liberal religion—of our Unitarian faith—is that it does not require intellectual assent to any proposition, even the proposition that God is necessary. For this reason there are within our ranks many noble men who justifiably reject the dominant classical idea of God and who are alert to the havoc wrought by this idea. Such men are citadels of free community, of free religious community. We need them! They are gadflies who sting our indolence and force profound, precise thinking. They adore with their lives the very God whom we adore, even if they prefer not to use His name. Words are important—but not essential! Integrity of faith is important—and essential!

Let us now ask our question once again, “Is God necessary?” Or shall we ask, “Is Life necessary?” The questions are ultimately one and the same.

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Miss A. Graham Ikin, M.A., M.Sc. (article page 105) writes from Cumberland where she retired from being Organising Secretary and Lecturer for the Archbishop of York's Committee of Doctors and Clergy. Previous article in this Journal: “The Dilemma of Pacifism,” Vol. 6, Pt. 1, p. 27.

Existentialism— Its Strength and Weakness

L. J. VAN HOLK

THE first thing is to explain the meaning of the term existentialism. The second, is to explain the cultural background from which existentialism springs. And the third is to indicate the positive elements existentialism contains for the construction of liberal civilization and religion in the twentieth century.

First then, existentialism and what it means. The word "existence" had no special significance in the vocabulary of philosophy until about 1840 when the Danish Christian philosopher, Kierkegaard, began to use it with a very definite meaning. He understood existence as the word by which he wanted to describe the real Christian life. Over against the speculative philosophy of Germany at that time as expressed in Hegel, he set forth the idea that man is a creature who lives in a tension between eternity and time. Man, being earth-bound, has something in him of time, of temporal life and, at the same time, he has something in him of eternity; he is really a child of God. He fails to live up to both these standards, for only an animal would be a creature of time and only an angel would be a creature of eternity. Man is something between: his life is lived in a tension between these two poles of existence. For Kierkegaard, existence means the reality of sinful, difficult, tragic human life.

After Kierkegaard the word slept until, in the hands of the German philosopher, Heidegger, it came to life again. In 1927 Heidegger published a thick volume on *Being and Time, Sein und Zeit*. I shall try, without going into the technical details of philosophical language, to state the two main points of interest to us. Existence, for Heidegger, means that man is a creature of anxiety and care. He is lost in his surroundings, and lives an impersonal life. Our everyday life is the kind of life which we describe by admitting we do not know really what we are talking about, as when we say, "'They' say that the government will do such and such a thing. 'They' say that we are in for a depression." This is the kind of thing we are mixed up with day after day, and that is our uncertain, our impersonal way of living, bound by anxiety and Care. We write, for this occasion, the word care with a capital "C." Frau Sorge, well known from Goethe's *Faust*, is a symbol for man's life which is always looking anxiously for the things to come—for his daily bread. This is what preoccupies Heidegger: man is always living ahead of himself and is a loaded, heavy, unfortunate creature. This is one way in which we have to think about existence according to Heidegger: living in care and anxiety.

At the same time, it is the task of philosophy to take man back from the periphery of life to its centre, into what he calls "authentic" life (a word which in German reads *Eigentlichkeit*). Authentic life is what you personally are. So now it is not what "they" say and "they" know, but now what *you* say and *you* know —*you* personally. We have a word for this in German which I cannot translate into English—*Meinigkeit*. This is your real life, what is each moment your own. This is what you do not have in everyday life but is what you are supposed to live up to. The call for authentic life is the second half of the problem of existence and philosophy has the task to lead us to it.

In one of his later essays, Heidegger has given in beautiful language an example of this in the following way: He was asked to lecture to an association of architects and he talked to them about, "to build, to dwell, to be." He demonstrated how the verb "to build" (*bauen* in German) really has the same root as "to be." In English, your verb "to build" also derives from the root "to be." He then developed the idea that what we are really driving at when building our home is to find a place where we can dwell, where we can really persistently have our own company; that is to say, where we can confirm ourselves, where we can "be." This is a good example of what his philosophy in its positive elements can achieve. He tries to "unhide"—to make clear—to make meaningful man's real existence. He tries to educate us from care to a kind of freedom which consists, really, in being ourselves.

This interpretation of existentialism is a high one. If sometimes people are very much shocked about existentialism it is because they have seen some play by Sartre. If they are not pharisees but sincere people they may be pleasantly shocked by its lucidity and its sincerity. But Sartre says very unpleasant things and his philosophy has a kind of make-up which comes from the *boite de nuit*, the night club, and this is not true for Heidegger. Heidegger is a farmer's son who lives in a hut outside a small town in the German Black Forest. As you come to know him, you get the idea of a man who is very far from our modern, agitated way of life, and who just wants to think in the way that, as a thinking human being, he *is*. He who *is* lives in such a way that his thinking is the consequence of his being. This is a very high attitude and is not common to life on either side of the Atlantic. Heidegger deserves to be called the first and foremost of European existentialist philosophers. Here, then, is existence in its heaviness, in its sorrowful being, bound up with care, being called to the authentic life which is in *being*.

In the writings of Sartre, we find a different philosophical climate. Sartre has a brilliant mind, with an extraordinary knowledge of the human heart and a Frenchman's refined sense for dramatic situations. That is why he is such a good playwright. That is why his *No Exit*, *Morts sans Sepulture*, and his other plays have had so much effect on Western Society. He has the rare courage to

analyze man, in his pettiness and spiritual poverty, as a creature of conflicting desires who is projected into being. We are conditioned by the circumstances we have been in from our birth. But you are a man and *you shall stand up!* You shall have your freedom because you were thrown into life not as an animal but as a human being! That means you are born with a sense of freedom. You are doomed to liberty. You just do not have the courage *not* to be human; you have to be free.

This, of course, is very different from the pessimism of former centuries when people said of the criminal, "Oh, well, it's not his fault, that's his inheritance; that is, just his sickness. What could you expect, with his ancestry of alcoholism, he's bound to be a criminal." But Sartre says, "Oh, you think you are a born criminal, do you? Well, I'll teach you another tune, and you are going to stand up and go down this lane if I tell you to, because this is the road that leads to freedom and it's your road." A kind of heroic pessimism very different from the other in its emotional outlook.

Existence, then, still means for Sartre—and this is again a different use from Heidegger—that man is, as he says, *un Dieu manqué*, a God who failed. You will also find in existentialist literature the expression that we are "shipwrecked" people, *Schiffbrüchige, Echoué* in French. And this is a very common human experience. It is all very well to put in a country's Constitution that "every man has a right to pursue his own happiness." It is one thing to say this; it is another thing to realize it. It is not so easy as people may think it is. Here again, European life being different from American life, it is not so astonishing that this experience of "shipwreck" has something to do with the Sartrian form of existentialism.

Most people know, not in any definite way, but in a kind of emotional or vague way, that existentialism implies a lurid view of life, an outspoken nihilism, the doom of liberty; in other words, just the post-war European situation. And yet this would be a misdrawn picture of existentialism. Not only does Heidegger not subscribe to this view, but the Catholic apologists of our time have found in existentialism a philosophy which they think they can accept. There is Gabriel Marcel with his metaphysical journal; there was the philosopher Louis Lavelle and some others who uphold the banner of the Catholic religion, while at the same time priding themselves on being existentialists. How is this possible? It is because, in the Catholic view of life, there is, on the one hand, a tradition of the philosophy of Plato which is all for generalities and, on the other hand, and even deeper, the philosophy of Aristotle in which there is the accent, the stress, on individual freedom. This individual freedom, which is part of the Catholic doctrine of man, they believe they find well expressed in existentialism, but, of course, only such existentialism as can be enlightened by the revelation of the Church under the direction of its priesthood!

With the one exception of Karl Jaspers I shall not discuss other existentialists because that would lead us too far afield. Jaspers began as a Doctor of Medicine with a strong philosophical interest. In post-war Germany he has been one of the leading spirits as the exponent of an idealistic, helpful and humanistic form of existentialism. For him existence means that we, living in the encompassing mass of cosmic extension of matter, are, at the same time, called to a life which can penetrate into the very core of being by the light of reason. His belief in reason implies a sense of reaching from desire to aspiration. This view, this framework of spiritual idealism is what he finds in existence. Human existence, for him, is being on the road from less understanding to more understanding, from being given up to the forces of everyday life, to reaching out to a life which would be independent. There is a certain kinship between Jaspers and Heidegger in their belief in the possibility of penetrating the centre and meaning of life with the light of reason. Human existence is called upon to live not only onward but most definitely to live upward to a realm of freedom and understanding. Such striving represents the meaning of full humanity.

So much for the meaning of the word existence. My second point is to give some reasons why existentialism is *the contemporaneous European philosophy*.

First, in the midst of our modern, rationalistic and technological society, with its industrial set-up, there is always a hidden centre of the unreasonable. Perhaps this is best expressed in the man, Hitler. The Nazi Empire, insofar as it was administered, organized and governed and went to war, was, of course, technically and mechanically as well organized as any modern state can be. But at the head of this machinery there was a man whose ultimate aims comprised something highly unreasonable. This unreasonable factor drove his country to defeat. It was an example of the unreasonable in the midst of a rationalistic society. Existentialism has pointed out that this is the way things are; that you cannot call man a reasonable creature without making qualifications. He is a creature with reason but how incredibly stupid he can be, how incurably stupid, generation after generation! We know this to be true over and over again in our own experience. I shall not speak for anyone but myself. Insofar as I am a professor of philosophy, I hope I have some reason, but, at the same time, I feel that many decisions in my life have not been made on the basis of reason but on the basis of desire, prejudice, emotion, and that this emotional element in life really constitutes our secret blessedness. We don't like to admit this, and yet it generally is true. There is the mixture of reason and unreason. An American has written a book called *The Feast of Unreason*. There is some truth in this, provided we are not conceited about it, as if we had no part in this unreason.

The second thing is the importance of understanding our extreme time-consciousness. If you speak with people of a really agrarian

society far from urban life, you will find that their life goes far more in tune with the rhythms of the seasons as one year after another comes and goes in its recurrent round from sowing to harvesting. Of course, a peasant also knows that he is growing older, but the rhythm of agrarian life is far slower than the rhythm of urban life. The peasant is also much farther away from the nervous centres of finance and war and industry than is our urban society. We are always living with a look at our watch. I wonder whether we always realize how extraordinary it is that we are such time-bound, time-aware, time-ridden people. Is it astonishing then, that in these times there should originate a philosophy of *Sein und Zeit*—Being and Time?

This second problem is of great interest, the more so as it accounts for the feeling of being driven on and on and on to meet, one day, inescapably, Death. An American novelist has called death "The Beloved." Is it? To ask the question is to give the answer, and European existentialism in its outspoken crudity says it is not. Death is your eternal enemy and a philosophy of life which does not give an account of the problem of Death is no philosophy at all. The problem in existentialism is the struggle between mass existence and individual freedom. We are mass creatures, and not only in war time. Just look at these crowds of people in our large cities—London, New York, or Paris—who go to work at nine, are thrown back to the suburbs at five or six in the afternoon, day after day after day. This is not because people enjoy it but because mass existence exerts a compulsion from which men cannot escape. And yet people on the subway, on the streetcar or in a car, may very well, at the back of their minds have some dream, some aspiration of freedom, of their real—to quote Heidegger—their "authentic" life, which does not find expression in the inauthentic forms of our everyday living. There is, then, inescapable and undeniable struggle between our mass existence and our individual life, between our aspirations towards a kind of collective happiness and our aspirations after something unique. This struggle is also in the background of existentialism.

Now we turn to a more realistic and sober view of the nature of man. I think that Locke and Jefferson are a little behind the times and that life is not so easy as they imagined it to be. I do not deny that they had a relative right to speak as they did in the 17th and 18th centuries when many things were simpler. But, in our time, to pretend that man is a good and a nice fellow is really overstating the case! He is not and we know it. This is more in harmony with orthodox Christian theology than with liberal. But it is a real, authentic and true rediscovery, and it might be an indication why liberalism has so feeble a grip on modern man. The deep trend of instinctivism in man is well understood by existentialist philosophy. If you would grant me that all philosophy makes for truth and that there is no salvation whatsoever for any man or group of men unless

it be a salvation in truth—that is, according to the facts, in harmony with things as they really are and not as we wish them to be—then this whole existentialist development is a valuable contribution to an understanding of ourselves, our times, and of life itself.

Furthermore, Jaspers has taught us that reason and love are the great weapons with which we have to elucidate life. In this elucidation of life Jaspers maintains that philosophy is the rationalizing after-thought (or after-what-is-given-us-in-forethought), an unpremeditated realization and illumination which comes to us. Transcendent and enigmatic this power remains but it is still the real power behind the scenes. Our philosophy, according to Jaspers, is rooted in the Judeo-Christian religion, the Western tradition of religion. Therefore, all our philosophy, even when atheistic, is really based upon the same religious conviction. Religion alone can overcome the tragedy of the world by the serenity and peace of its unshakeable belief in eternal truths. So far Karl Jaspers is the champion of religious liberalism in our day, of a kind of universal humanism and of a spiritual democracy which we hope may permeate the body of the German nation.

Concluding, I would say that existentialism is the attitude of mind which tries, by reasoning, to get abreast of the unreasonable in life. It is the expression of our post-war generation, of its problems and anxieties. No philosophy and no religion can hope to be of any importance in modern Western life, unless it takes existentialism into account. We cannot brush it aside, but must go through with it in order to overcome it for to achieve a more harmonious way of life, which is not yet ours. Here, then, is both weakness and strength. It is, of course, in many ways a negativism of the modern mind, of people who are living between hope and despair. Its weakness is that it has made anxiety its central theme. But its strength is that, in doing so, it has made us far more aware of the darker side of life than we ever were before. It has taught us something which Paul Tillich has given in the title of his little book *Courage to Be*. "Courage to be" is one of the greatest achievements of philosophy and religion. I have tried to dispel some of the easy prejudices against existentialism and have offered some hope that, in existentialism and its many trends, there is a pushing-onward of the human spirit which, in its bravery and its will to understand, is worthy of the highest traditions of Western civilization, religion and art, by its courage to be.

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Automation, Society, and the Protestant Non-Conformist Tradition

CLARK KUCHEMAN

THE writing of this paper is precipitated by the convergence of two concerns. The first of these is the necessity of coming to terms with what seems to be a decisive force in the shaping of our social-institutional destiny. This force is called automation. The second, which involves my personal and voluntary association with the free church tradition, is to establish the relevance of non-conformist ethics to modern industrial society. Therefore the intent of this paper is to correlate the non-conformist ethic with the problems created by automation. The attempt will be made to relate Christian social principles, stressing particularly the contribution of the non-conformist tradition, to the institutional implications of automation, by way of designating specific recommendations.

The thesis of the paper is that (a) the ethic of Christian non-conformism is relevant to the social problems of automation insofar as the demand for decentralization and dispersion of power is applied to actual situations; but that (b) it is irrelevant to the extent that it identifies decentralisation and dispersion of power with a fictitious notion of automatic harmony.

Two implicit assumptions are made throughout:

- (a) Man is considered in the context of the social institutional arrangements in which he finds himself. Therefore the Christian notions of Creation, Judgement, and Redemption are to be applied to institutional structures as well as to the individual.
- (b) Ethical principles and systems become meaningful only to the extent that they are spelled out in terms of their institutional implications.

It should be emphasized here that my concern is not especially to describe how the contemporary free church movement will, in fact, respond to the problem in question. Rather it is to develop a constructive approach, founded upon the central principles of the non-conformist tradition. I hope to suggest a framework of orientation which is both socially responsible and consistent with the ethical tradition of non-conformism.

I

The method is to establish relevant social-ethical principles by way of "radicalizing" certain concepts found within the Christian non-conformist movement. Therefore it can be said that my source is non-conformism, inasmuch as it represents a particular interpretation and actualization of Biblical meaning. The procedure is to

(a) formulate a definition, (b) list the general characteristics, and (c) cite some historical effects of the non-conformist tradition. These are then to be radicalized into several basic normative principles which will later be applied to the specific situations posed by automation.

A definition of non-conformism can be formulated along such lines suggested by Prof. Roland Bainton, in the *Journal of Religion*, as the following. Non-conformism refers to that tradition within historic Protestantism whose institutional nature is maintained independent of state and civil authority. "The left wing is composed of those who separated church and state and rejected the civil arm in matters of religion."¹ Professor Bainton also points out that this characteristic, if taken to be definitive, is usually accompanied by other characteristics, forming a complex of unique features.

For the sake of brevity, the characteristics of non-conformity will be grouped under two heads: the doctrine of man as individual and the doctrine of the church as social institution.

One of the primary features of non-conformity is its view of the role of the individual. A. D. Lindsay points out that it is non-conformity which finally takes seriously the Reformation doctrine of the priesthood of all believers and attempts to apply it institutionally². The English Independents, Anabaptists, and Quakers are especially noted. Oliver Cromwell's application of non-conformist individualism is an example of this effort. From his point of view, democracy is seen as the machinery by which each individual may express in discussion his particular insight into the will of God. The attitude toward the individual is the central idea which determines the social content of non-conformism. According to Malcomb Spencer³ the notion of the individual as autonomous and as possessing a right to private judgement in religious matters requires the *institutional structure* to be directed toward the benefit of the individual. In line with this "trusteeship for personality" certain institutional recommendations are promulgated . . . e.g. adequate education, abolition of slavery, etc. The stress upon individual autonomy is demonstrated by non-conformist concentration upon individual moral perfection and personal conversion.⁴ Adult baptism points to the basic notion of voluntary and explicit expression of one's faith. Faith cannot be reached through forced subscription to codes or to institutional arrangements. The general view of non-conformism is that progress is best assured if the individual is left free from the restrictions of static creedal formulations and external religious authority. This is exemplified in the almost

¹ Bainton, Roland, "The Left Wing of the Reformation," *Journal of Religion*, XXI, 1941.

² Lindsay, A. D., *The Essentials of Democracy*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1929.

³ Spencer, Malcomb, "Social Contributions of Congregational and Kindred Churches," *Sociological Review*, XXV, July-Oct, 1943.

⁴ Bainton, *op. cit.*

universal opposition of non-conformity to capital punishment.⁵
 "To burn a man is not to prove a doctrine but to burn a man."

For the Anglo-American non-conformist tradition the Bible is affirmed as a record of inspiration for every arena of life. This provides the rationale for the application of the concepts of freedom and individual autonomy to secular concerns.

In summary, Christian non-conformism presents the following assertions concerning man as individual:

- (a) Radical affirmation of individual autonomy (the priesthood of all believers).
- (b) Concern for individual moral perfection in the context of institutional arrangements (trusteeship for personality).
- (c) Affiliation with religious group is to be on the basis of voluntary and explicit decision.
- (d) Religious life and secular life are in unity with one another.

The non-conformist view of the church as a social institution is, of course, derived from its individualism. The church is a voluntary association of individuals who respond freely to the message of the church. Membership in the church is elective rather than inclusive.⁶ Members are admitted on the basis of personal conviction as demonstrated by moral perfection. This implies that individuals are to act within the society in terms of their faith and that the group is to remain in tension with the society . . . neither identifying itself with it nor divorcing itself completely from it. Since the group is a voluntary association, it is marked by its separation from the coercive power of the state. It necessarily must claim the right of free association within the state and of freedom to act autonomously, if necessary, against the restrictions of external authority. The church thus acts as a leaven . . . within, but in tension with, the state. As Spencer points out, however, this emphasis upon autonomy does not imply advocacy of anarchy. The emphasis upon autonomy must assume a basic framework of order within which to function freely. E. S. Bates,⁷ while promoting a class-struggle explanation of non-conformist activity, points out that it took its stand with the bourgeoisie and participated in the drive toward the recognition of voluntary association. The groups themselves are organized along lines consistent with their radical individualism. Each congregation was conceived as independent of the movement as a whole and decisions within each group were made with the participation of every member. A. D. Lindsay is emphatic in stating that this experience on the part of the early members provided the inspiration for the establishment of democratic government. With respect to the conception of the church as an independent body, Spencer points out that the non-conformists also embraced what he calls "trusteeship for the local community." The peculiar history of

⁵ Bates, E. S., *American Faith*, W. W. Norton Co., New York, 1940, ch. 2.

⁶ Bainton, *op. cit.*

⁷ Bates, *op. cit.*

non-conformity directed its attention to the influencing of the local community. Among other factors, Spencer states that the autonomous view of ecclesiastical organization was carried over by implication to other types of local groups. Thus in political and economic organization the impetus of non-conformity is toward the authority of the local group. Margaret James cites the historic contribution of this emphasis as helping to break down the English ecclesiastical power by gaining the allegiance of moderate business enterprise which was revolting against ecclesiastical restrictions in the economic realm.⁸ Therefore one of the early manifestations of the demand for autonomy was its identification with the rising middle class. (The fact that this identification has persisted beyond the point of being a true expression of the demand for local autonomy has contributed to the growing irrelevance of non-conformity on the contemporary scene).

In summary, the non-conformist tradition implies the following with respect to the church as a social institution:

- (a) It affirms the church as a voluntary group based upon explicit decision of its membership. The concept of the church is that it is to act as a leaven within society as a whole.
- (b) Sources of authority are said to rest primarily in small associations which are to have an autonomy independent of the larger group—be it the larger church or the state.
- (c) The historic role of non-conformity is to defend the rights of local autonomy against centralized authority and the exercise of unchecked power.

Although the principles already enumerated constitute "radicalizations" from more basic theological concepts, I would like to further "radicalize" by listing several practical principles to be later applied to the problems created by automation. My assertion is that any ethic derived from the non-conformist tradition must include the following:

- (a) The individual is the ultimate source of authority in the making of decisions. Each individual must have some voice in policy which substantially affects his well-being . . . including economic decisions.
- (b) Centers of political and economic power must be held responsible to the community as a whole. Some form of order must be devised to make this a reality.
- (c) Action should be taken for the purpose of dispersing the centers of power so as to decentralize, as much as possible, the making of crucial decisions.
- (d) The role of small groups united for affecting public policy must be emphasized as a means for promoting change and reform.

⁸ James, M., "The Effect of the Religious Changes of the 16th and 17th Centuries on Economic Theory and Development," in Eyre (ed.), *European Civilization*, Oxford University Press, London, 1937, Vol. V.

II

In a series of three articles in the *New Leader* (U.S.A.), Daniel Bell, an authority on labor, testifies to the formative role of technology in our society.⁹ He states that in spite of the fact that relatively few people are actually employed in factories, the ethos of the U.S. is conditioned largely by its technology. The factor of technology in any particular social-economic problem is always the starting point. "It is technology that shapes the process of work. It is with those technological assumptions—and the fact that they are unquestioned—that we must start." The individual is usually called upon to adjust to the machine rather than vice-versa.

Thus, the study of automation is especially relevant to human institutional relations and the ethical implications involved therein. Automation must be scrutinized in the light of its effect upon human existence in its social-institutional aspects.

Automation may be tentatively defined as a tendency in technology which radically reduces the importance of human labor in the realms of *production*, *administration*, and *communication* on behalf of some type of automatic mechanism. It is, broadly, a process of self-regulating production which not only transfers products from one machine to another, but which takes information—standards of quality and quantity—fed from a central point into the system and automatically adjusts and regulates production. All repetitive processes are included within the system. Two rather spectacular illustrations are as follows:

- (a) The Ford engine plant in Cleveland, Ohio, unites 42 machines on the cylinder block line with automatic devices. It performs approximately 530 cutting and drilling operations without being touched. Forty-one men are able to produce in three hours what previously required 117 machinists $4\frac{1}{2}$ hours. Twenty of these 41 men are tool repair men who merely replace tools as they are indicated by another automatic device.
- (b) Project "Tinkertoy," a U.S. Bureau of Standards factory, manufactures complex electrical parts. It produces 1,000 sub-assemblies every hour and completely assembles 20 different varieties of units. The factory employs only a few inspectors and repair men. The Ratheon Company, using "Tinkertoy" methods, requires only two workers to produce 1,000 electrical units daily, which production formerly needed 200 workers.

It is the thesis of this paper that we are now on the verge of large-scale adoption of automated methods. Evidence of this conclusion can be observed in the fact that four new periodicals devoted to automation have recently appeared in the United States; and an appreciable rise in productivity per man-hour is obviously imminent. For any large manufacturing concern the advantages in automating are tremendous. And, the "Tinkertoy" experiment seems to indicate a fantastic versatility of automated tools.

⁹ Bell, Daniel, "The Organization of Work," *New Leader*, Sept. 6, 1954.

Two major threats are implied in automation. The first is the probability of a great reduction and change in the nature of employment. The second is the threat of a radical acceleration of the movement toward concentration and centralization of economic (and political) decision. Each of these are problems of an ethical nature.

With respect to the problem of employment, selected examples preview a radical reduction of labor needs in key areas. The Ratheon Company, for example, displaced labor at the rate of 100 to one. The Ford engine plant, mentioned above, displaced labor at a five to one ratio. An automated Dow rolling mill displaced at the rate of ten to one. Further illustrations show similar figures: Columbia's Bridgeport record pressing plant, a ratio of 500 to one; Eagle-Ottawa Leather Tannery, a ratio of about ten to one; and a Westchester, New York, bank uses a typing machine for computers which eliminates 300 typists. Mr. Gabriel Kolko, an American student of automation, estimates that labor will be displaced at a ratio of five to one during the coming years. This is a conservative estimate, but it nevertheless carries profound implications for the future of employment. In fact, a spiral effect of automation might be expected if adjustments are not made. As labor is displaced, the tendency is for employers to further cut costs by instituting more automation. From the employer's side, of course, automation is "cost cutting." From the point of view of labor, and of the economy as a whole, it is simply unemployment. A traditional argument against the dangers of this type of unemployment is that if the economy continues to expand at a given rate, the unemployment will be absorbed. The difficulty with this point is that, whereas labor is displaced from the *old* methods of production, it is reabsorbed only at the automated rate. Thus, if the five to one estimate is reasonably accurate, it will be necessary for the economy to expand, not at the rate of 4.2% (as suggested by the "Conference on Economic Progress")¹⁰ but at multiples of that figure.

Recent history has reflected the growth of productive efficiency by a continuous rise in the proportion of administrative and clerical labor. However, automation threatens even the clerical worker. Many office and white collar jobs are as routinized as factory jobs. The advent of the computer, automatic filing systems, typing machines, and accounting systems, poses a radical elimination of white collar jobs. For example, a machine is envisaged which can completely take care of household electric meters, water meters, etc. Impulses are to be automatically recorded at the central office on punched cards, and then at the end of the month bills will be automatically made up and automatically mailed out. The County Trust Company, at Westchester, New York, mentioned above, with partial automation has cut its accounting staff from 157 to 42 persons.

¹⁰ Report of the Conference on Economic Progress, "Toward Full Employment and Full Production," *New Republic*, August 9, 1954.

It is obvious that the economy must face a drastic change in the allocation of labor. If labor is to be so significantly reduced in the areas of production and administration, it must be increasingly directed to those areas which are not susceptible to automation . . . i.e. the service occupations. But it seems to me that a more basic issue is that of increasing purchasing power at a rate at least equal to the increase in productivity. And yet, recent history indicates that this is not likely. From 1946 to 1952, states the *CIO News*, productivity per man-hour was increased by 16.3%, whereas the index for real hourly earnings of manufacturing workers was increased by only 12.8%. The CIO Committee on Economic Policy also points out that since 1952 the industrial production index has risen 14 points while total employment has remained nearly the same and unemployment has risen by 1.4 millions (as of March 1955). Similarly, the Department of Labor has stated that whereas electronics output in 1952 was 275% higher than in 1947, only 40% more workers were needed.

Furthermore, little improvement in this respect can be hoped from labor union activity. An extensive study made by Prof. Harold Levinson¹¹ indicates that trade union activity has not succeeded in significantly altering the pattern of wage distribution. According to this study the share of the private national income received by labor from 1923 to 1947 has remained nearly constant (1923—59.6%, 1929—57.1%, 1947—59.8%). Also, it demonstrates that what changes have occurred in the way of wage increases have been largely due to changes in government labor policy rather than to union activity.

Thus, the question of how to maintain a high level of employment is an ethical problem posed by automation. If a just economic system is to be desired on the basis of the Christian faith, an adequate constructive approach to unemployment must be found . . . one which is also consistent with the ethical principles of the non-conformist tradition.

A second threat is posed by automation in the form of increased concentration of economic power. Even under present conditions economic concentration is considerable. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission reports that in 1947, 46% of the property, plant, and equipment used in manufacturing was owned by the 113 largest corporations.¹² And evidence revealed by the allocation of government contracts during the Korean War indicates that concentration has been increased, at least in certain crucial areas. Fifty corporations received two-thirds of the dollar volume of war contracts during this war, whereas one hundred so participated in World War II. Furthermore, the proportion of prime military contracts

¹¹ Levinson, Harold, *Unions, Wage Trends, and Income Distribution, 1914-1947*, University of Michigan Press, 1951.

¹² Federal Trade Commission, "Concentration of Productive Facilities," 1946, p. 16, Govt. Printing Office.

awarded to companies with less than 500 employees decreased from 25% in 1950 to 16% in 1953.¹³ Accordingly, the *Chicago Daily News* reports that in 1954 forty-four of the largest companies earned one-third of all corporate profits.¹⁴ Although many "liberals" point to the number of smaller businesses and assert that these act to counterbalance the power of the larger ones, the fact is that many, if not most of these, are dependent upon the large corporations for their continued existence. T. K. Quinn, an authority on American corporate structure, demonstrates that, with only slight effort, the giants could exterminate many smaller companies by the sole virtue of their tremendous capital resources.¹⁵

But the relative power of the giants promises to be greatly increased by automation. This is probable for two basic reasons.

First, the process of automating is extremely expensive. The necessary initial expenditure is prohibitive for small corporations. Vast amounts of capital are necessary. But once automation is instituted its return in terms of reduced cost is remarkable. Insofar as the small companies are unable to automate they will be smothered by the tremendous productive efficiency of the automated ones. Furthermore, automation is practicable only on a large scale. It cannot be used efficiently for small-scale production. It will no longer be economical to produce small quantities of a given standard product as is now the practice of small manufacturers. For example, the cost of automating the engine production lines of Ford and General Motors was \$50,000,000 each. Smaller companies find this kind of initial cost prohibitive. The three largest automobile producers in America monopolize 96% of the market . . . and last year were the only ones to show a profit. All of this is in spite of the several large-scale automotive mergers during the past few years.

The second tendency relates to the loosening of internal and external restraints upon size. Prof. Kenneth Boulding notes that the size of an organization is limited by the encountering of increasingly unfavorable environment and increasingly awkward internal structure.¹⁶ With respect to external restraints, the great efficiency of automation promises to extend these by eliminating competition and by its ability to supply vast quantities of products at low cost. The big difference, however, lies in the realm of internal restraints. According to Prof. Boulding, the growth of organizations is limited by increasing immobility which is caused largely by the breakdown of communications. But automation will now make it possible to

¹³ Adams, W., and Grey, N., *Monopoly in America*, MacMillan Co., New York, 1955.

¹⁴ *Chicago Daily News*, May 12, 1955, p. 54 (news item).

¹⁵ Quinn, Theodore K., *Giant Business: Threat to Democracy*, Exposition Press, New York, 1953.

— *Giant Corporations: Challenge to Freedom*, Exposition Press, New York, 1956.

¹⁶ Boulding, Kenneth, *The Organizational Revolution*, Harper & Bros., New York, 1953.

create a much larger and more powerful centralized organization. Automated forms of book-keeping, communication, computing, filing, etc. make it possible to maintain efficient control over an immense organization. Whereas heretofore it has been necessary to disperse control and decisions among various independent or semi-independent industries (subsidiaries), it will now be more efficient to centralize decisions in a central headquarters. For example, Firestone Rubber Industries at present maintains separate administrative facilities for its tyre company, its industrial products branch, and its steel products branch. These branches are able to act somewhat independently, subject only to the broad policy of the central office. With automation all administration can be accomplished in the central office. The problem posed to democratic society by this movement is obvious.

In summary, automation presents the following ethical challenges:

- (a) It demands a constructive resolution of the problems to be created by the radical displacement of labor from the areas of production and routine administration. The problem focusses upon the necessity of buying power to keep pace with greater productivity and of redirecting labor supply into substitute areas.
- (b) It demands a constructive approach to the inevitable increase of economic power concentration which threatens to centralize economic and political decision into the hands of relatively few managers.

III

We have seen so far that the non-conformist ethic demands a final reference to the individual and that automation precipitates conditions which challenge this ethic. It now remains to propose concrete recommendations on the basis of the information presented above.

Briefly, the non-conformist demand for individual perfection within a context of social-institutional arrangements calls for an economic order which maintains sufficient stability to enable personal decision (trusteeship for personality). The demand for decentralization and dispersion of power calls for an economic order which is responsive to the final authority of the individual and which gives every individual some voice in the making of vital economic decisions.

Technological advance is not inherently evil. We cannot allow ourselves to fall into the error of assuming that automation itself is the cause of this concern. Rather, the problem of automation is a human one which arises from the prideful attempt of men to utilize its benefits narrowly. Economic problems today are not due to defects in the productive mechanism but to faults in the system of distribution and consumption . . . inequitable distribution of the fruits of productivity. At present the contradiction between consumption and production is discernible by observing that an extensive

defense budget and manpower allocation (approximately 40 billion dollars devoted to arms with roughly 3 million persons in the armed services in 1956) is falling short of maintaining the economy of full production. Already this year key industries are beginning to feel the difficulties. The automobile industry is anticipating a drop of up to 30 per cent. Home construction was expected to fall by 20 per cent in 1956.

The rising productivity of automation, plus the possibility of military cuts, points toward difficulty in the not-too-distant future.

The requirement in terms of a constructive resolution is two-fold:

(a) Measures must be taken to increase consumptive power to keep pace with increases in productivity. And yet so far it seems that this is not likely. Earlier in the paper I pointed out the discrepancy between the climbing rate of productivity and the rate of increase of real wages. Also, we must take into consideration that the distribution of income in the U.S. is essentially the same now as it has been in the past . . . in spite of assertions to the contrary. Statistics reveal that in 1910 the upper fifth of income units received 46.2% of money income whereas the lowest fifth received 8.3%. In 1948, the upper fifth received 46.9% with the lowest fifth receiving only 4.2%. In 1950 the highest fifth received 47%, as contrasted with the mere 3% received by the lowest fifth. As a broad indication, the lowest half of income earners in 1910 received 26.8% of the national money income whereas in 1950 the same half received only 23%. During recent years much faith has been placed in the redistributive effects of progressive taxation. However, in actuality, taxation makes little difference in the overall picture. In 1950 the highest tenth of income units received 29% of money income before taxes. After taxes they still remained with 27%. (Incidentally, in 1942, a war year, the highest tenth received 33% of money income before taxes). The second highest tenth received 15% both before and after taxes.¹⁷

So, to say the least, the historical trends do not seem to be moving automatically in the direction of the necessary adjustment. The failure of organized labor to alter the pattern is obvious once again.

(b) A broad policy must be initiated so as to direct a long-term movement of labor into areas not affected by automation. For example, it is commonly known that a very small proportion of people who are qualified for advanced academic work actually engage in it. There is an acute shortage of teachers, physicians,

¹⁷ "Statistical Abstracts of the United States—1952," Govt. Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1953.

"Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945," Govt. Printing Office, 1949.

"Continuation to 1952 of Historical Statistics of U.S.", Govt. Printing Office, 1954.

technicians, and other professional people. Much of this talent is not utilized because of the prohibitive costs of preparation involved. A correlative action should be devoted to education for the use of leisure. In any case, long-term planning is necessary to prepare for the inevitable changes which are to occur.

Consideration of these problems of economic justice and stability lead us to the question as to whether the solution to them can be accomplished within the structures of power which now exist—problems which promise to be intensified with automation. The problem of economic justice is ultimately a problem of power. . . . And the problem of power is ultimately a problem of democracy, decentralization and dispersion . . . the particular concerns of non-conformist Christianity.

We have observed in the previous section the extent to which economic power is already concentrated and how this concentration threatens to become greater under the impact of automation. Prof. Eduard Heimann, of the New School for Social Research, presents the thesis that the preservation of democracy depends upon the proper relationship between freedom and order.¹⁸ He states that as long as economic activity continues to be held in order by the competitive process, a good measure of justice and stability is possible. However, when the balance of competitive power is destroyed by the development of "inordinate liberty" (monopoly, oligopoly), a new form of order becomes necessary. Thus the rapid growth of industrial concentration implied in automation calls for a reconsideration of the structure of order in the economy. The economic effect of industrial concentration, apart from its effect upon democracy as a whole, is significant. During the period 1929 to 1932 when the volume of production fell almost half, the fluctuation of prices in monopolistic industries was relatively small. The price of nickel remained nearly constant, aluminium fell only about 4%, plate glass 2%, and automobiles 21%. Agricultural commodities, on the other hand, a competitive enterprise, dropped only 6% in production but 63% in prices. It is clear that monopolistic industry has the effect of cutting production in order to maintain prices . . . showing a remarkable lack of responsiveness to the competitive market.

Our task, then, in formulating a relevant non-conformist ethic, is to propose a type of economic order which is able to subject the centers of "inordinate liberty" to a form of control which is consistent with the principles of decentralization and dispersion. Thus the two requirements of planning for increased purchasing power—including greater economic equality—and for reallocation of labor supply finally focus upon the problem of power and its control. If the analysis of this paper is correct, then we are to be faced with the realities of economic instability and industrial concentration.

¹⁸ Heimann, Eduard, *Freedom and Order*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1947.

I think it is time for a reconsideration of the relevance of democratic socialism to the modern economy. The existing structure of power is incapable of long-range planning on a democratic base. It is incapable of planning for the inevitable shift of manpower and it cannot bring about the degree of redistribution of income necessary for consumption to keep pace with productivity. As long as concentrated economic power is governed by the motive of profit for a relatively few stockholders (according to the *CIO News*, 6/10ths of 1% of American families own 80% of all publicly held corporation stock) it cannot be permitted to control the economic destiny of the community as a whole. Although democratic socialism is certainly no final solution to the issues presented, it does seem likely to be successful so long as it is utilized pragmatically and not dogmatically. Democratic socialism should be used as a technique, as a means, toward the following goals:

- (a) Provide a new concept of property which is consistent both with democracy and with the economic inevitability of centralization.
- (b) Realize a form of decentralization by making economic decision and the exercise of economic power the responsibility of the community as a whole.
- (c) Provide the opportunity for democratic planning with respect to reallocating labor into alternative channels. Inasmuch as planning, as such, is inevitable, there being only a choice between concentrated private planning and democratic public planning, democratic public planning constitutes a form of decentralized decision.
- (d) Enable a more basic redistribution of income and the direction of the economy on the basis of use or need rather than of private profit.

It must be remembered, however, that socialism is not to be an end in itself. It is to be regarded as a method whereby the concentrated power of "inordinate liberty" may be brought into public responsibility. Hence, social ownership need not be applied to those areas where competition serves to retain a reliable form of order and justice. Social ownership is not to be thought of as an all-inclusive form. It should act as a parallel form, existing alongside a considerable sector of private ownership. Each is to fulfil, under different economic circumstances, the function of democratic ownership. Also, it must be remembered that there are dangers implied in any concentration of power . . . even when subjected to democratic control. Therefore, social ownership itself should be decentralized as much as possible. The lowest levels of authority possible should be utilized. The existence of separate centers of power must consciously be preserved both in the public sector and the remaining private sector.

It seems to me that the above characterization of democratic socialism is the logical application of the non-conformist ethic to the impending situation. The practical application of any ethical system

depends upon both a devotion to the principles of that ethic and a realistic appraisal of the situation to which it is to be applied. In the face of the inevitable movement toward concentrations of economic power, the concept of democratic social ownership and control is the most adequate expression of the demand for decentralization of decision and dispersion of power. Democratic socialism is not a contradiction of the non-conformist valuation of the individual . . . it is a reapplication of non-conformist individualism under changed historical circumstances.

Thus, in conclusion, the recommendations are as follows:

- (a) Ownership of productive property should be transferred from the private to the public sphere in those areas where economic power exerts excessive power over the community as a whole.
- (b) Within the structure of the mixed economy as a described above, policies should be formulated so as to increase the buying power of the community in order to absorb the greater productivity.
- (c) Long-range public planning should be directed toward the alleviation of inevitable displacement of labor from the automated sectors by such means as greater educational facilities, training for service occupations, and instruction in constructive use of leisure.

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The Art of Christian Living

SIR HARRY LINDSAY

IN an earlier article we examined the Science of Christian Living.* We turn now from the Science to the Art of Christian Living, from a consideration of the conditions or laws making the good life possible and of the fallacies which make it difficult, to the study of the good life itself. We are concerned now with the imaginative rather than the rationalizing activities of the mind; and since the imagination functions largely by pictures, by direct glimpses of reality rather than by the indirect process of discarding fallacies to reach the truth, we shall be forced to make free use of metaphor and allegory, simile and symbol, in describing the impressions which unite to form the complete picture.

Of himself and by himself man cannot reach the perfection designed for him—his spiritual destiny—that divine perfection to

* Previous issue, Vol 10. Pt. 1. p. 77 Personal note p. 89.

which Jesus invited his followers to aspire. Man proceeds by trials and errors, and as often as not finds himself dependent for further progress upon a faculty which he calls inspiration. He seems to possess it and yet he cannot control it. It appears to come from within his own mind, as does his imagination, and yet within his mind it is dormant until an impulse from without quickens it to thought and action. He can only prepare himself to receive it and profit by it gladly when it comes.

It is by such imaginative inspiration that the Christian life is lived. It is God's own gift, and our first picture must be of a God who is ever more ready to hear than we to pray, to give than we to ask, to pardon than we to repent, to open than we to knock, to inspire than we to aspire. In fact it is God who takes the initiative, who sows the good seed of his inspiration broadcast, knowing that much seed will be wasted and yet confident that some human hearts will prove to be good soil prepared to receive it.

The background of our picture, then, is the Sower of all good seed, and in the foreground is the world of human hearts in various stages of preparedness. An essential element in the picture is the process of soil-preparation. We can readily see that the ordinary give and take of everyday life, with its human needs, desires and aspirations and their satisfaction, with the tensions underlying human relationships and with the reactions of human minds to those tensions in courage or fear, in love, indifference or hatred, supplies a rough and ready preparation of the soil for the reception of the seed. Here are the warmth of love, the sunshine of joy, the satisfaction of rain, the freezing of despair, the ploughing of pain and the harrowing of sorrow. Here, in the stresses and strains of life, the human heart begins to learn life's cardinal lesson, the lesson of its own needs, its own radical self-insufficiencies, its own dependence on others for all that makes life worth while.

It is, then, the ordinary experiences of everyday life which prepare the human soul for the reception of the good seed. Yet these same experiences may have a contrary effect. The soul-soil may become so trodden down and hardened by the carelessness or indifference or deliberate cruelties of passers-by that the seed cannot germinate. Or the hardness may be part of its own unredeemed nature, the stony self so close to the surface that even if the seed does germinate it can only wither and die in self's proximity. Or the soul may be so preoccupied with the cares and pleasures of the world that other seeds germinate and the good seed falls unheeded. Or finally, to vary the parable but to complete the picture, the spirit of evil which is the cumulative worst in human society may have deliberately sown tares to the exclusion of good seed.

The art of Christian living, then, is intimately related to the art of good husbandry—the preparation of human souls for the activities of Spirit. The good seed must take its chance on the soil

on which it falls, but human influences are primarily responsible for the condition of the soil; and one can only conclude that the success of Sower and seed turns entirely on the extent and the quality of human co-operation in preparation of the soil for the sowing. In other words, while sin, pain and sorrow are inevitable in the world known to us, their worst effects can be remedied by human love and sympathy, and it is on this co-operation that the Sower relies. Thus the Christian's primary task in life is the preparation of human souls as happy and fertile soil for the Sower; and he may be called also to that higher responsibility of acting as God's agent in the sowing of the seed.

* * *

We pass now from the task involved in Christian living—from the plan of campaign—to the technique which the Christian must adopt. The differences between Science and Art are many and obvious, for they start from different premisses. But they do indeed meet, and one of their meeting-points is in the sphere of Technique. An art, no less than a science, must develop its own technique in its relevance to the world of human needs.

What is the Christian technique in the art of living and how is it to be mastered? Man is born with a sort of inner register, inherited from his ancestors, which sensitizes him to the claims of the good life, often expressed in terms of the needs of his fellow men and women. But experience shows that, like a ship's compass, his inherited conscience may lead him astray. It may, of itself, prove unreliable unless constantly resensitized to the attractive power of the divine Will.

And yet this simile of the ship's compass, good though it may be, supplying to our picture new touches which our previous simile of Sower, seed and soil could not supply, will not carry us the whole of the way we wish to go in picturing the technique of the art of living. For the ship of the human soul has many duties to perform in life besides that of merely avoiding disaster. That is a negative aspect of the art. It is the positive duties which are the most important, for they cover the constructive aspects of life, and the apprentice must master them also if he is to become a true expert in the technique of living.

How does the Christian practise the art of living? To this question there can be only one answer, namely the study of the art as preached and practised by Jesus Christ. Jesus was everything to the common people of his race and generation; he fed and healed, preached and taught, blessed — yes, and cursed — threatened, humoured, taunted, entreated and compelled, and all was done in recognition of human needs of body, mind and soul. He was the great physician and surgeon, watchful and prayerful, skilled both to diagnose and to prescribe, to use lancet and knife. His methods, his technique, are no less vital to the Christian of to-day, and through the Christian to humanity at large.

St. Paul's simile exactly illustrates the absorption of the apprentice who studies the technique of the art of living as mastered by Jesus Christ: " For we all, with unveiled faces (with no introvert obsessions), beholding as in a mirror the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image (of the divine personality) from glory to glory (from one stage to another of grace and power)." That surely is how the technique of Christian living is acquired.

* * *

But art has other and more permanent preoccupations than the daily tasks and the technique for dealing with them. It is also concerned with values, and the teaching of Jesus turned largely on spiritual values, on the urgent necessity that men and women should revise their human assessments of life's values. On the one hand there is much that they must unlearn if their apprenticeship is to end in profession. On the other hand the best way to unlearn wrong valuations is to learn the right ones. Revaluation leads of itself to that devaluation which is needful if the real values of life are to be appreciated.

So an essential lesson in the art of living is a lesson in revaluations. And perhaps the clearest example of the need of a revaluation of human standards occurs in Jesus's attitude towards sin, and in the relative seriousness of different sins in his judgment. Sins of the body did not call for his sternest denunciations but rather those subtle sins of the mind which by human standards are commonly regarded as weaknesses or failings rather than sins. The hypocrite, for example, gives to God and man his second or third best, or even his worst, whilst parading whole-hearted devotion in the shop-window of his mind. That is a form of cheating, and Jesus clearly held it a more serious offence to cheat of love than of material things.

Which is more venal, the actual offence, or the state of mind which inspires the offence? Murder, by human standards, is criminal, but by the standards of the Kingdom of Heaven it is hatred which is the crime of crimes; and there are degrees of hatred, from that which reveals itself in anger, or in contempt, to that worst hatred which seeks to kindle hatred. So also adultery is inspired by lust, and, one might add, theft by covetousness.

From devaluations and revaluations we turn to the values themselves, the ultimates and the absolutes, the realization of which is fundamental to the art of living. They belong to a world other than this world of humanity and yet, paradoxically enough, their essential feature is their simplicity. The mystery of the world of Spirit, the Kingdom of Heaven, is often regarded by mankind as a mystery so baffling that the mind recoils from it. This world is complex enough as it is, they say, without the introduction of a new set of complications: this-world values are difficult to master, and when mastered are the only safe pointers to a life of reasonable human relationships.

But supposing, for the sake of argument, that this were not the case? Supposing that the strains and stresses, the pains and sins and despairs of life, were due to the admitted complexity of human standards? Supposing the way of escape were not to go blindly forward, in complacent acceptance, but to turn back in the contrary direction, to face the source and origin of all life? Would the mystery of a future life not resolve itself into the one certainty underlying all life, past, present and future? And would not that certainty appear as something simple, something intelligible, something so infinitely great that it is more wise, more loving, more real and therefore more supremely personal than human personality itself?

It is not quantities that matter so much as qualities, not the size of the contribution to the treasury as the fulness of the heart which gives its last farthing. Human tastes are often offended, but there is a more spiritual taste which accepts the sinner's penitence, however abject, and finds joy in it. Human laws are complex and grow more complex from year to year, but the divine values are dictated by the single and simple law of Love; and even when Jesus revealed this as a dual law, love of God and love of neighbour, he yet reduced it to one again, in showing that the love of the least of brothers or sisters is often identical with the love of God.

A second point of importance which concerns the spiritual values is that they are assimilated rather than taught. They cannot be reduced to a code, though they can be illustrated by practical examples as in the Sermon on the Mount. They spring naturally from within a mind which practises the presence of God, which looks to him, listens to him, leans on him, learns of him, longs for him, loves him and thus grows in his Spirit. In this sense the values are not deliberately acquired; they become the second nature of the child of God, inspired into him as he aspires to them. They are the Will of God in its application to human thoughts and ways; and the man who grows in the image of God in which his primeval ancestors were created begins to look on life with God's eyes in the light of God's values.

And a third point relates to the joy which underlies the application of the spiritual values to the problems of everyday life, and which characterizes the art of living. All art is linked with enjoyment, with the discovery and application of aesthetic values. But the enjoyment of spiritual values has this difference, that it may be capitalized. Instead of being liquidated at once—"they have received their reward"—it may be deferred, stored up for the future and (who knows?) may acquire interest of its own kind, a treasure of credit in the heavenly places. To love your friend is liquidation, for it brings an immediate return, but to love your enemy is capitalization. The joy of service is long-term whilst that of domination is short-term, if only because service sets up credits beyond this world's valuations.

The eternal values cannot be catalogued, though St. Paul did

name some of the most important, calling them fruits of the Spirit: Love, joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance. They cannot be computed or reduced to a science or a code, although they can be manifested, as Jesus revealed them in his life on earth. They cannot be learnt by rote, but they can be accepted by faith, practised and thus assimilated in the sense that practice makes perfect. To master them is to master the art of living with God, who through his Spirit gives to those who ask the vision and appraisal, the appreciation and exercise, of his own eternal values.

* * *

How easily might God compel the obedience of man by means of some world-wide Pentecost. Instead, God rejoices when man takes the initiative, when man recognizes his own self-inadequacy and places his needs of body, mind and soul in God's hands. There is a saying that Nature abhors a vacuum, and yet perhaps that is not the right way of looking upon vacua in the physical world. Might it not be truer to say that it is Love which drives Nature to rush in, to occupy and make her own the empty and desolate spaces of the world? And might not one say with equal truth that the Spirit loves to rush in and fill human hearts which have emptied themselves of all self-will "for My sake and the Gospel's"?

One last simile seems necessary to our study of the art of Christian living. God's Plan for humanity is like a musical composition and we, the orchestra and choir, with instruments and voices, are to give our various renderings of the score. We have three clear duties to perform: we must keep time, following both baton and score, learning when to sing or play slow, when fast. We must keep the true note in harmony with each other. And we must keep throughout the divine tone, neither too soft nor too loud, neither over-subdued nor too self-assertive. The score, the Plan, is God's, and he has entrusted its execution to mankind, his children, his apprentices in the art of living.

A Liberal Theology

A REVIEW OF *Dogmatik* BY DR. FRITZ BURI

E. L. ALLEN

THE *Dogmatik* of Karl Barth is not likely to be surpassed in bulk for a long time; nor can we expect it to be matched in its subtlety of argument, which we can appreciate even though we may think that sometimes the conclusion was reached first and the premisses found afterwards. But now Barth's achievement has been challenged, and that from his own stronghold of Basel. Fritz Buri's *Dogmatik* (Verlag Paul Haupt in Bern: Swiss Francs, 28) is comparatively

modest in compass, but it will run to several volumes before it is complete. No such effort, so the preface tells us, has been made for thirty years; during that time liberals have occupied this or that theological area, but none has attempted an occupation of the whole territory. The first volume is by way of introduction and is devoted to the theme of "revelation and reason"; "nature and grace" is to be that of the next.

The main influence on Buri's thinking, as his previous books, especially his *Theologie der Existenz*, have shown, is that of Karl Jaspers, also now at Basel. The title itself—*Dogmatik als Selbstverständnis des christlichen Glaubens*—points clearly in that direction. The truth with which we are dealing here is—to use my own language—the truth that *transforms* rather than the truth that *informs*. It is not that which lodges in the head but that which enters the heart and is built into the life. Such truth is apprehended by faith. For knowledge is not adequate to all our experience; it presupposes the self that is always subject and never object, and it comes to a halt before the Transcendent. Faith is not anything specifically Christian, it is a general human possibility. While it is not knowledge, it must be exposed to the impact of knowledge, both for its own health, to free it from any admixture of superstition, and for purposes of communication. Theology therefore comes about by the interplay of personal confession and impartial enquiry; it grows strong by self-criticism and it finds its security in submitting to test after test.

Alongside of the influence of Jaspers can be detected that of Barth. For Buri's theology is as unashamedly Christian as it is avowedly philosophical. It stands squarely within the Christian tradition and it appeals to the authority of the Bible. Buri claims that he is only carrying Barth's principles to their logical conclusion. The Word of God is not identical with the Bible; it is not even to be found within it; it comes to pass, as it were, when the language of the Bible claims me; when, in mythological language, God by its means speaks personally to me. The distinction between revelation and religion is maintained; the latter may be so inadequate to the former that the protest of atheism is justified. The God whom men define and demonstrate is not the true God. But—and here is an important distinction—Buri does not appeal to Scripture alone, but to the whole Christian tradition as it comes down the centuries and as it is bound up with what we call secular history.

This new dogmatic is not, of course, constructed *in vacuo*. It is presented as the outcome of a historical development, and three main types of theology are singled out as having held sway in the past. The first tends to assimilate revelation to reason; under this head Buri includes not only Kant but also Schleiermacher, not only the Hegelians but also the Ritschlians. The second compromises between revelation and reason, as when Catholicism and Protestant orthodoxy agree that one shall lay the foundations and the other shall build on them. Finally, in our own day, a theology has appeared

that spurns reason in the name of revelation. It claims to be based solely on Scripture and is busy ridding itself of any taint of philosophy, even the philosophy of Kierkegaard.

One of the most valuable sections of the book is the one that deals with symbols, distinguishing them from signs, explaining how they function, and warning against their misuse. What arises in the meeting with the Transcendent can be expressed only in symbol; even when propositions are used, these are not factual statements but claim and commitment. The symbol at once stores up past revelation and makes a new one possible. It is historically conditioned, because God does not reveal himself in vague and general fashion, but to this or that person where he stands within history and through a particular tradition. It is misused equally when it is taken as a source of supernatural information and when it is dismissed as unscientific. As Niebuhr has it, we must take our symbols seriously but not literally. Once we accept without reserve the fact that we have no truth except what is refracted through a symbol, we shall be ready for toleration and mutual understanding.

The book is rich in suggestion, the product of an independent mind, and it shows that a renaissance of liberalism is something of which we need not despair. Some in the English-speaking countries will say that it is distressingly orthodox, while Continentals will pass the opposite judgment on it. At any rate, it represents a type of theology we should do well to take seriously. In my judgment, much of our liberalism is sadly lacking in the discipline of historical knowledge and afraid of taking what the Bible has to offer. We can learn something from Barth and much more from Jaspers. He can show us how to be confessional without being subjective and rational without being rationalist. There are some points at which, to be sure, I should like Professor Buri to think again. I am not as sure as he is that in speaking of self-understanding he always avoids subjectivism. The language is that of Jaspers but the implication is sometimes perilously close to Schleiermacher. Nor am I happy about the stress he lays on tradition. Certainly, if he appeals, not merely to the Bible, but to the whole Christian tradition as it comes down the centuries, he must employ a principle of selection of some kind. And may there not be a situation in which one has to choose between truth and tradition, not merely find the one through the medium of the other?

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